INTRODUCTION. La pr\u00e9sente affaire concerne la dur\u00e9e des investigations pr\u00e9liminaires men\u00e9es dans le cadre de la proc\u00e9dure engag\u00e9e par le requ\u00e9rant, l\u2019absence d\u2019un recours effectif permettant \u00e0 ce dernier, en tant que partie l\u00e9s\u00e9e, de se plaindre \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard et le classement sans suite de la plainte de l\u2019int\u00e9ress\u00e9 en raison de la prescription. Le requ\u00e9rant all\u00e8gue une violation des articles\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01, 8, 13 et\u00a014 de la Convention.<\/p>\n
PREMI\u00c8RE SECTION Art 6 \u00a7 1 (civil)\u2022 Acc\u00e8s \u00e0 un tribunal \u2022 Dur\u00e9e des investigations pr\u00e9liminaires ayant emp\u00each\u00e9 le requ\u00e9rant de se constituer partie civile dans une proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale et de demander r\u00e9paration du pr\u00e9judice civil\u2022 Action class\u00e9e sans suite en raison de la prescription de l\u2019infraction avant l\u2019audience pr\u00e9liminaire \u00e0 partir de laquelle la partie l\u00e9s\u00e9e peut se constituer partie civile \u2022Comportement fautif des autorit\u00e9s \u2022 Art 6 applicable, le requ\u00e9rantayant exerc\u00e9 au moins l\u2019un des droits et facult\u00e9s express\u00e9ment reconnus par la loi interne \u2022 Plainte visant \u00e0 faire valoir le droit de caract\u00e8re civil\u00e0 la protection de sa r\u00e9putation\u2022 Introductiond\u2019une action aux m\u00eames fins en responsabilit\u00e9 civile devant la juridiction civile ne pouvant \u00eatre exig\u00e9e STRASBOURG Cet arr\u00eat deviendra d\u00e9finitif dans les conditions d\u00e9finies \u00e0 l\u2019article 44 \u00a7 2 de la Convention. Il peut subir des retouches de forme.<\/p>\n En l\u2019affaire Petrella c. Italie,<\/strong><\/p>\n La Cour europ\u00e9enne des droits de l\u2019homme (premi\u00e8re section), si\u00e9geanten une Chambre compos\u00e9e de\u00a0: Raffaele Sabato, juges,<\/p>\n et de Renata Degener, greffi\u00e8re de section,<\/p>\n Vu\u00a0:<\/p>\n la requ\u00eate susmentionn\u00e9e (no 24340\/07) dirig\u00e9e contre la R\u00e9publique italienne et dont un ressortissant de cet \u00c9tat, M. Vincenzo Petrella (\u00ab\u00a0le requ\u00e9rant\u00a0\u00bb), a saisi la Cour en vertu de l\u2019article\u00a034 de la Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l\u2019homme et des libert\u00e9s fondamentales (\u00ab\u00a0la Convention\u00a0\u00bb) le 1er juin 2007,<\/p>\n la d\u00e9cision de porter \u00e0 la connaissance du gouvernement italien (\u00ab\u00a0le Gouvernement\u00a0\u00bb) la requ\u00eate,<\/p>\n les observations des parties,<\/p>\n Apr\u00e8s en avoir d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9 en chambre du conseil le 2 f\u00e9vrier 2021,<\/p>\n Rend l\u2019arr\u00eat que voici, adopt\u00e9 \u00e0 cette date\u00a0:<\/p>\n INTRODUCTION<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. La pr\u00e9sente affaire concerne la dur\u00e9e des investigations pr\u00e9liminaires men\u00e9es dans le cadre de la proc\u00e9dure engag\u00e9e par le requ\u00e9rant, l\u2019absence d\u2019un recours effectif permettant \u00e0 ce dernier, en tant que partie l\u00e9s\u00e9e, de se plaindre \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard et le classement sans suite de la plainte de l\u2019int\u00e9ress\u00e9 en raison de la prescription. Le requ\u00e9rant all\u00e8gue une violation des articles\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01, 8, 13 et\u00a014 de la Convention.<\/p>\n EN FAIT<\/strong><\/p>\n 2. Le requ\u00e9rant est n\u00e9 en 1951 et r\u00e9side \u00e0 Caserte. Il a \u00e9t\u00e9 repr\u00e9sent\u00e9 par Me\u00a0A. Imparato, avocat.<\/p>\n 3. Le Gouvernement a \u00e9t\u00e9 repr\u00e9sent\u00e9 par son ancien agent, Mme\u00a0E.\u00a0Spatafora.<\/p>\n 4. Le requ\u00e9rant est avocat. \u00c0 l\u2019\u00e9poque des faits, il \u00e9tait \u00e9galement pr\u00e9sident d\u2019une \u00e9quipe de football, la \u00ab\u00a0Casertana \u00bb.<\/p>\n 5. Le 22 juillet 2001, le journal \u00ab\u00a0Corriere di Caserta\u00a0\u00bb publia, en premi\u00e8re page, un article intitul\u00e9 \u00ab\u00a0Trou de mille milliards \u00ab\u00a0sign\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb Petrella\u00a0&\u00a0Co.\u00a0\u00bb. L\u2019article, accompagn\u00e9 d\u2019une photographie du requ\u00e9rant, contenait le passage suivant\u00a0: \u00ab\u00a0L\u2019administration sanitaire locale et la r\u00e9gion saign\u00e9es \u00e0 blanc en six ans. Chiffres \u00e0 neuf z\u00e9ros pour les honoraires dupr\u00e9sident de la Casertana, Petrella, alors que le juge (pretore)[1] \u00e9tait [X], num\u00e9ro deux de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9, qui a fait ex\u00e9cuter 6\u00a0066 saisies-arr\u00eats, enrichissant ainsi ses amis avocats. (…). Six ans de saign\u00e9es dans le budget dela sant\u00e9 publique pratiqu\u00e9es par des juges et des avocats (comme par hasard Petrella et [X], aujourd\u2019hui pr\u00e9sident et vice-pr\u00e9sident de la Casertana), [qui] auront des r\u00e9percussions pendant des d\u00e9cennies\u00a0\u00bb. Les 23, 24 et 25 juillet 2001, le \u00ab\u00a0Corriere di Caserta\u00a0\u00bb publia d\u2019autres articles ayant un contenu semblable \u00e0 celui du 22 juillet.<\/p>\n 6. Estimant que les articles parus dans le \u00ab\u00a0Corriere di Caserta\u00a0\u00bb avaient port\u00e9 atteinte \u00e0 son honneur et \u00e0 sa r\u00e9putation, le requ\u00e9rant porta plainte le 28 juillet 2001 pour diffamation aggrav\u00e9e par voie de presse (diffamazione a mezzo stampa) contre leur auteur et le directeur de ce journal ainsi que contre le pr\u00e9sident et l\u2019administrateur d\u00e9l\u00e9gu\u00e9 de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 d\u2019\u00e9dition. Dans sa plainte, d\u00e9pos\u00e9e devant le procureur de Santa Maria CapuaVetere, le requ\u00e9rant pr\u00e9cisait qu\u2019il entendait se constituer partie civile dans la proc\u00e9dure et demander dix milliards de lires italiennes (ITL), soit cinq\u00a0millions d\u2019euros (EUR), de dommages-int\u00e9r\u00eats. En outre, il indiquait souhaiter \u00eatre inform\u00e9 d\u2019un \u00e9ventuel classement de sa plainte.<\/p>\n 7. Le 10 septembre 2001, l\u2019affaire fut d\u00e9f\u00e9r\u00e9e au parquet du tribunal de Salerne, comp\u00e9tent rationeloci pour en conna\u00eetre.<\/p>\n 8. Par une d\u00e9cision du 9 novembre 2006, communiqu\u00e9e au requ\u00e9rant le 2\u00a0d\u00e9cembre\u00a02006, le procureur demanda le classement sans suite de la plainte de l\u2019int\u00e9ress\u00e9 en raison de la prescription de l\u2019infraction p\u00e9nale d\u00e9nonc\u00e9e.<\/p>\n 9. Par une d\u00e9cision du 17 janvier 2007, le juge des investigations pr\u00e9liminaires de Salerne classa la proc\u00e9dure sans suite, faisant ainsi droit \u00e0 la demande du parquet.<\/p>\n LE CADRE JURIDIQUE ET LA PRATIQUE INTERNES PERTINENTS<\/p>\n 10. Le droit et la pratique internes pertinents concernant la loi no 89 de 2001 (\u00ab\u00a0la loi Pinto\u00a0\u00bb) se trouvent d\u00e9crits dans les arr\u00eats Cocchiarella c.\u00a0Italie ([GC], no 64886\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 23\u201131, CEDH 2006-V) et Arnoldi c. Italie (no 35637\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 15-19, 7 d\u00e9cembre 2017).<\/p>\n 11. Selon l\u2019article 79 du code de proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale (CPP), la partie l\u00e9s\u00e9e ne peut se constituer partie civile qu\u2019\u00e0 compter de l\u2019audience pr\u00e9liminaire, celle-ci constituant le moment de la proc\u00e9dure o\u00f9 le juge est appel\u00e9 \u00e0 d\u00e9cider si l\u2019accus\u00e9 doit \u00eatre renvoy\u00e9 en jugement (voir, pour plus de d\u00e9tails sur le statut de la partie l\u00e9s\u00e9e en droit italien, Arnoldi, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7\u00a7 15-18).<\/p>\n 12. L\u2019article 55, alin\u00e9a 1, l. a) du d\u00e9cret-loi no 83 du 22 juin 2012 (ult\u00e9rieurement converti en loi, sans modification sur le point expos\u00e9 ci\u2011apr\u00e8s, par la loi no\u00a0134 du 7 ao\u00fbt 2012)a introduit \u00e0 l\u2019article 2 de la loi Pinto un alin\u00e9a 2 bis, qui pr\u00e9voit, notamment, que la dur\u00e9e du proc\u00e8s p\u00e9nal doit \u00eatre calcul\u00e9e \u00e0 partir du moment o\u00f9 la personne l\u00e9s\u00e9e est admise au proc\u00e8s en tant que partie civile. En estimant ledit alin\u00e9a compatible avec l\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1 de la Convention, par son arr\u00eat no 249 d\u00e9pos\u00e9 le 25 novembre 2020, la Cour constitutionnelle a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 manifestement mal fond\u00e9e la question de constitutionnalit\u00e9 port\u00e9e \u00e0 son attention.<\/p>\n 13. Selon l\u2019article 127 des dispositions d\u2019impl\u00e9mentation (disposizioni di attuazione) du CPP, le greffe du parquet doit transmettre chaque semaine au procureur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral pr\u00e8s la cour d\u2019appel la liste des enqu\u00eates pour lesquelles le parquet n\u2019a pas engag\u00e9 de poursuites p\u00e9nales ou n\u2019a pas demand\u00e9 le classement sans suite des accusations.<\/p>\n 14. Les articles 405 et 406 du CPP pr\u00e9voient des d\u00e9lais pour l\u2019accomplissement des actes d\u2019investigation par le parquet. Une fois que les d\u00e9lais pr\u00e9vus pour l\u2019engagement des poursuites p\u00e9nales ou le d\u00e9p\u00f4t d\u2019une demande de classement sans suite des accusations sont \u00e9chus, d\u2019apr\u00e8s l\u2019article 413 du CPP, il est loisible \u00e0 la personne l\u00e9s\u00e9e (persona offesa) de demander au procureur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral pr\u00e8s la cour d\u2019appel de proc\u00e9der \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9vocation de l\u2019enqu\u00eate au sens de l\u2019article 412 du CPP.<\/p>\n 15. L\u2019article 412 du CPP, en vigueur \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque des faits, disposait ce qui suit en ses parties pertinentes en l\u2019esp\u00e8ce\u00a0:<\/p>\n Article 412 – \u00c9vocation d\u2019enqu\u00eates pr\u00e9liminaires \u00e0 d\u00e9faut de poursuites p\u00e9nales<\/p>\n \u00ab\u00a01. Le procureur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral pr\u00e8s la cour d\u2019appel proc\u00e8de, par d\u00e9cret motiv\u00e9, \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9vocation des enqu\u00eates pr\u00e9liminaires lorsque le procureur n\u2019engage pas les poursuites p\u00e9nales ou ne demande pas le classement sans suite dans le d\u00e9lai fix\u00e9 par la loi ou prorog\u00e9 par le juge. (…)<\/p>\n 2. (…)\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n 16. L\u2019article 413 du CPP est libell\u00e9 comme suit\u00a0:<\/p>\n Article 413 \u2013 Demande de la personne faisant l\u2019objet d\u2019investigations pr\u00e9liminaires<\/p>\n ou de la personne l\u00e9s\u00e9e<\/p>\n \u00ab\u00a01. La personne faisant l\u2019objet d\u2019investigations pr\u00e9liminaires ou la personne l\u00e9s\u00e9e peut demander au procureur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de proc\u00e9der \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9vocation de l\u2019enqu\u00eate conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 l\u2019article 412 \u00a7 1 du CPP.<\/p>\n 2. Apr\u00e8s avoir \u00e9voqu\u00e9 l\u2019enqu\u00eate, le procureur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral m\u00e8ne les enqu\u00eates pr\u00e9liminaires n\u00e9cessaires et formule ses demandes [demande de classement sans suite ou engagement des poursuites p\u00e9nales] dans un d\u00e9lai de trente jours \u00e0 partir de la date de la demande d\u2019\u00e9vocation introduite conform\u00e9ment aux termes du premier paragraphe.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n 17. Le Conseil sup\u00e9rieur de la magistrature (CSM) a \u00e9t\u00e9 saisi le 27 mars 2007 d\u2019une demande portant sur la validit\u00e9 et l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation de sa pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente d\u00e9lib\u00e9ration du 16 juillet 1997 concernant la r\u00e9glementation de l\u2019\u00e9vocation des enqu\u00eates pr\u00e9liminaires pour lesquelles les d\u00e9lais \u00e9taient \u00e9chus. Par une d\u00e9cision du 12 septembre 2007 (\u00ab\u00a0Pouvoir d\u2019\u00e9vocation du procureur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral pr\u00e8s la cour d\u2019appel\u00a0\u00bb), le CSM a tout d\u2019abord rappel\u00e9 qu\u2019il avait men\u00e9 une enqu\u00eate sur les approches et les diff\u00e9rentes pratiques adopt\u00e9es par les parquets g\u00e9n\u00e9raux et en avait conclu que le droit interne ne pr\u00e9voyait aucun pouvoir discr\u00e9tionnaire du procureur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral en mati\u00e8re d\u2019\u00e9vocation. \u00c0 la lumi\u00e8re de ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments, tout en pr\u00e9cisant qu\u2019il \u00e9tait \u00ab\u00a0conscient du fait qu\u2019il \u00e9tait impossible pour les parquets g\u00e9n\u00e9raux de r\u00e9ussir \u00e0 \u00e9voquer toutes les enqu\u00eates pr\u00e9liminaires pour lesquelles les d\u00e9lais \u00e9taient d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9chus et, ensuite, \u00e0 mener \u00e0 terme lesdites enqu\u00eates dans le bref d\u00e9lai de trente jours \u00e0 partir de la d\u00e9cision d\u2019\u00e9voquer l\u2019affaire\u00a0\u00bb,\u00a0le CSM a not\u00e9 que sa d\u00e9lib\u00e9ration de 1997 avait indiqu\u00e9 une solution pratique \u00e0 la question concernant les crit\u00e8res \u00e0 retenir pour la s\u00e9lection des affaires \u00e0 \u00e9voquer et qu\u2019elle visait \u00e0 \u00ab\u00a0apporter une solution raisonnable \u00e0 une situation qui, autrement, pourrait devenir insoutenable \u00e9tant donn\u00e9 que les parquets g\u00e9n\u00e9raux n\u2019[avaient] pas la possibilit\u00e9 mat\u00e9rielle d\u2019\u00e9voquer toutes les enqu\u00eates pr\u00e9liminaires pour lesquelles les d\u00e9lais [\u00e9taient] \u00e9chus \u00bb. En effet, en 1997, le CSM avait limit\u00e9 l\u2019\u00e9vocation obligatoire aux seules affaires o\u00f9, une fois les d\u00e9lais \u00e9chus, le procureur ne pouvait pas demander le classement sans suite ou engager les poursuites p\u00e9nales car d\u2019autres actes d\u2019enqu\u00eate \u00e9taient n\u00e9cessaires.<\/p>\n EN DROIT<\/p>\n I. SUR LA VIOLATION ALL\u00c9GU\u00c9E DE L\u2019ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 DE LA CONVENTION<\/p>\n 18. Le requ\u00e9rant se plaint que la dur\u00e9e de la proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale ait \u00e9t\u00e9 excessive et que, en d\u00e9cidant le classement sans suite de sa plainte p\u00e9nale en raison de la prescription, les autorit\u00e9s internes l\u2019aient emp\u00each\u00e9 d\u2019acc\u00e9der \u00e0 un tribunal. Il invoque l\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1 de la Convention, qui est ainsi libell\u00e9\u00a0:<\/p>\n \u00ab\u00a0Toute personne a droit \u00e0 ce que sa cause soit entendue \u00e9quitablement (…) et dans un d\u00e9lai raisonnable, par un tribunal (…), qui d\u00e9cidera (…) des contestations sur ses droits et obligations de caract\u00e8re civil (…)\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n 19. Le Gouvernement admet que l\u2019affaire porte principalement sur\u00ab\u00a0l\u2019inaction du parquet qui aurait entra\u00een\u00e9 la prescription et emp\u00each\u00e9 l\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 un tribunal \u00bb mais conteste la th\u00e8se soutenue par le requ\u00e9rant.<\/p>\n A. Sur la recevabilit\u00e9<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Sur l\u2019applicabilit\u00e9 de l\u2019article 6 de la Convention<\/em><\/p>\n 20. Le Gouvernement soutient que les griefs du requ\u00e9rant sont incompatibles ratione materiae et qu\u2019ils doivent donc \u00eatre rejet\u00e9s. Il indique en particulier ce qui suit\u00a0: la proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale s\u2019est achev\u00e9e par un classement sans suite, et ce sans que l\u2019inculp\u00e9 ait \u00e9t\u00e9 renvoy\u00e9 en jugement\u00a0; par cons\u00e9quent, le requ\u00e9rant n\u2019a jamais eu la qualit\u00e9 de partie dans la proc\u00e9dure et il n\u2019a jamais pu demander de d\u00e9dommagement\u00a0; compte tenu du fait qu\u2019en droit italien le principe de la pr\u00e9\u00e9minence du p\u00e9nal sur le civil n\u2019est pas reconnu et qu\u2019il \u00e9tait loisible au requ\u00e9rant d\u2019entamer une proc\u00e9dure civile pour obtenir un d\u00e9dommagement, la proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale n\u2019\u00e9tait pas \u00ab\u00a0directement\u00a0\u00bb d\u00e9terminante pour le droit de caract\u00e8re civil de l\u2019int\u00e9ress\u00e9\u00a0; ainsi, contrairement \u00e0 ce qui pr\u00e9valait dans l\u2019affaire Perez c.\u00a0France ([GC], no\u00a047287\/99, CEDH 2004\u2011I), le volet civil n\u2019\u00e9tait pas \u00e9troitement li\u00e9 au d\u00e9roulement de la proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale.<\/p>\n 21. Le requ\u00e9rant argue que l\u2019article 6 de la Convention trouve \u00e0 s\u2019appliquer en l\u2019esp\u00e8ce.<\/p>\n 22. La Cour rappelle que, selon sa jurisprudence, la Convention ne reconna\u00eet pas, en soi, le droit de faire poursuivre ou condamner p\u00e9nalement des tiers. Pour entrer dans le champ de la Convention, ce droit doit imp\u00e9rativement aller de pair avec l\u2019exercice par la victime de son droit d\u2019intenter l\u2019action, par nature civile, offerte par le droit interne, ne serait-ce qu\u2019en vue d\u2019obtenir une r\u00e9paration symbolique ou la protection d\u2019un droit de caract\u00e8re civil, \u00e0 l\u2019instar par exemple du droit de jouir d\u2019une \u00ab\u00a0bonne r\u00e9putation \u00bb. D\u00e8s lors, l\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1 de la Convention s\u2019applique aux proc\u00e9dures relatives aux plaintes avec constitution de partie civile d\u00e8s l\u2019acte de constitution de partie civile, \u00e0 moins que la victime ait renonc\u00e9 de mani\u00e8re non \u00e9quivoque \u00e0 l\u2019exercice de son droit \u00e0 r\u00e9paration (Perez, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7\u00a7 66-71, et Gorou c. Gr\u00e8ce (no 2) [GC], no 12686\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 24\u201125, 20 mars 2009). De plus, la Cour a consid\u00e9r\u00e9 cette disposition comme applicable \u00e0 la partie l\u00e9s\u00e9e qui ne s\u2019\u00e9tait pas constitu\u00e9e partie civile, d\u00e8s lors qu\u2019en droit italien, m\u00eame avant l\u2019audience pr\u00e9liminaire, o\u00f9 une telle constitution peut \u00eatre pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e, la victime de l\u2019infraction peut exercer les droits et les facult\u00e9s express\u00e9ment reconnus par la loi (Sottani c. Italie (d\u00e9c.), no\u00a026775\/02, CEDH 2005-III (extraits), Patrono, Cascini et Stefanelli c.\u00a0Italie, no 10180\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 31-32, 20 avril 2006, et Arnoldi, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a025\u201144).<\/p>\n 23. En l\u2019esp\u00e8ce, la Cour constate que la plainte du requ\u00e9rant visait \u00e0 faire valoir un droit de caract\u00e8re civil \u2013 \u00e0 savoir le droit \u00e0 la protection de sa r\u00e9putation \u2013, dont l\u2019int\u00e9ress\u00e9 pouvait, de mani\u00e8re d\u00e9fendable, se pr\u00e9tendre titulaire. Par ailleurs, dans sa plainte, le requ\u00e9rant avait affirm\u00e9 qu\u2019il entendait se constituer partie civile dans la proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale et r\u00e9clamer cinq millions EUR de dommages-int\u00e9r\u00eats. Il avait \u00e9galement express\u00e9ment demand\u00e9 \u00e0 \u00eatre pr\u00e9venu d\u2019un \u00e9ventuel classement de l\u2019affaire (paragraphe 6 ci-dessus). Par cons\u00e9quent, le requ\u00e9rant a exerc\u00e9, au moins, l\u2019un des droits et facult\u00e9s reconnus par le droit interne \u00e0 la partie l\u00e9s\u00e9e (Arnoldi, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7\u00a041). Compte tenu des arguments avanc\u00e9s par le Gouvernement et des conclusions retenues par elle dans les affaires susmentionn\u00e9es, la Cour rejette l\u2019exception soulev\u00e9e par le Gouvernement. L\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1 de la Convention est ainsi applicable \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sente esp\u00e8ce.<\/p>\n 2. Sur l\u2019\u00e9puisement des voies de recours internes<\/em><\/p>\n a) Quant \u00e0 la demande d\u2019\u00e9vocation<\/p>\n 24. Le Gouvernement excipe du non-\u00e9puisement des voies de recours internes. Selon lui, eu \u00e9gard au fait que les articles 405 et 406 du CPP pr\u00e9voient des d\u00e9lais pour l\u2019accomplissement des actes d\u2019investigation, le requ\u00e9rant aurait pu se pr\u00e9valoir de l\u2019inaction du parquet, tout d\u2019abord en sollicitant le parquet lui-m\u00eame et ensuite en demandant, sur le fondement des articles 412 et 413 du CPP, au procureur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral pr\u00e8s la cour d\u2019appel de proc\u00e9der \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9vocation de l\u2019enqu\u00eate. \u00c0 cet \u00e9gard, la Cour constate que, dans ses premi\u00e8res observations, le Gouvernement a seulement mentionn\u00e9 un arr\u00eat de la Cour de cassation (no 19833 de 2009) et que, ult\u00e9rieurement, dans ses observations compl\u00e9mentaires, il a fait r\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 : a) une d\u00e9cision du 6\u00a0d\u00e9cembre 2011 du procureur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral pr\u00e8s la cour d\u2019appel de Brescia, par laquelle ledit procureur avait rejet\u00e9 une demande d\u00b4\u00e9vocation car le procureur en charge de l\u2019affaire avait entretemps clos les investigations pr\u00e9liminaires\u00a0; et b) la d\u00e9cision du CSM du 12 septembre 2007 concernant le pouvoir d\u2019\u00e9vocation du procureur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral pr\u00e8s la cour d\u2019appel.<\/p>\n 25. Le requ\u00e9rant estime que les voies indiqu\u00e9es par le Gouvernement ne sont pas effectives, pour les motifs suivants\u00a0: tout d\u2019abord, les autorit\u00e9s n\u2019avaient pas besoin d\u2019\u00eatre sollicit\u00e9es pour \u00eatre mises au courant des retards du parquet car, selon l\u2019article 127 des dispositions de mise en oeuvre du CPP, le greffe du parquet devait transmettre chaque semaine au procureur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral pr\u00e8s la cour d\u2019appel la liste des enqu\u00eates pour lesquelles le parquet n\u2019avait pas engag\u00e9 de poursuites p\u00e9nales ou n\u2019avait pas demand\u00e9 le classement sans suite des accusations\u00a0; en outre, la personne l\u00e9s\u00e9e n\u2019avait aucune possibilit\u00e9 de contraindre le parquet \u00e0 poursuivre l\u2019enqu\u00eate\u00a0; enfin, il ne jouissait d\u2019aucun \u00ab\u00a0droit\u00a0\u00bb effectif, fond\u00e9 sur une base l\u00e9gale claire et accessible, de formuler une demande d\u2019\u00e9vocation ni d\u2019aucun droit de contester le rejet \u00e9ventuel d\u2019une telle demande.<\/p>\n 26. La Cour rappelle que, aux termes de l\u2019article 35 \u00a7 1 de la Convention, elle ne peut \u00eatre saisie qu\u2019apr\u00e8s l\u2019\u00e9puisement des voies de recours internes. Tout requ\u00e9rant doit avoir donn\u00e9 aux juridictions internes l\u2019occasion de redresser les violations all\u00e9gu\u00e9es contre les Hautes Parties contractantes. Cette r\u00e8gle se fonde sur l\u2019hypoth\u00e8se, objet de l\u2019article 13 de la Convention \u2013 avec laquelle elle pr\u00e9sente d\u2019\u00e9troites affinit\u00e9s \u2013, que l\u2019ordre interne doit offrir un recours effectif quant \u00e0 la violation all\u00e9gu\u00e9e. Les dispositions de l\u2019article 35 \u00a7 1 ne prescrivent toutefois l\u2019\u00e9puisement que des seuls recours \u00e0 la fois relatifs aux violations incrimin\u00e9es, disponibles et ad\u00e9quats. Ces recours doivent exister \u00e0 un degr\u00e9 suffisant de certitude, non seulement en th\u00e9orie, mais aussi en pratique, sans quoi leur manquent l\u2019effectivit\u00e9 et l\u2019accessibilit\u00e9 voulues.<\/p>\n 27. En ce qui concerne la charge de la preuve, la Cour rappelle qu\u2019il incombe au Gouvernement excipant du non-\u00e9puisement de la convaincre que le recours \u00e9tait effectif et disponible tant en th\u00e9orie qu\u2019en pratique \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque des faits (voir, parmi beaucoup d\u2019autres, McFarlane c. Irlande [GC], no 31333\/06, \u00a7 107, 10 septembre 2010, Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 et autres c. Serbie (exception pr\u00e9liminaire) [GC], nos 17153\/11 et 29 autres, \u00a7 77, 25 mars 2014, et Magyar K\u00e9tfark\u00faKutyaP\u00e1rt c. Hongrie [GC], no201\/17, \u00a7 52, 20\u00a0janvier 2020). La base de la voie de recours doit donc \u00eatre claire en droit interne (Scavuzzo-Hager et autres c. Suisse (d\u00e9c.), no 41773\/98, 30\u00a0novembre 2004, et Ceylan c. Turquie (d\u00e9c.), no 26065\/06, 17 mars 2015). La disponibilit\u00e9 du recours invoqu\u00e9, y compris sa port\u00e9e et son champ d\u2019application, doit \u00eatre expos\u00e9e avec clart\u00e9 et confirm\u00e9e ou compl\u00e9t\u00e9e par la pratique ou la jurisprudence (Gherghina c. Roumanie (d\u00e9c.) [GC] no 42219\/07, \u00a7 88, 9 juillet 2015, McFarlane, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7\u00a7 117 et 120, et Mikolajov\u00e1 c. Slovaquie, no 4479\/03, \u00a7 34, 18 janvier 2011). Celle-ci doit en principe \u00eatre bien \u00e9tablie et ant\u00e9rieure \u00e0 la date d\u2019introduction de la requ\u00eate (Gherghina, d\u00e9cision pr\u00e9cit\u00e9e, \u00a7 88), sauf exceptions justifi\u00e9es par les circonstances d\u2019une affaire.<\/p>\n 28. Pour ce qui est du rem\u00e8de, \u00e9voqu\u00e9 par le Gouvernement, pr\u00e9vu par l\u2019article 413 du CPP (paragraphe 16 ci-dessus), la Cour rappelle qu\u2019elle a consid\u00e9r\u00e9, \u00e0 plusieurs reprises, qu\u2019un recours hi\u00e9rarchique n\u2019est pas un recours effectif d\u00e8s lors, qu\u2019en r\u00e8gle g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, il ne conf\u00e8re pas \u00e0 son auteur un droit personnel \u00e0 obtenir de l\u2019\u00c9tat l\u2019exercice de ses pouvoirs de surveillance (S\u00fcrmeli c. Allemagne [GC], no\u00a075529\/01, \u00a7 109, CEDH 2006\u2011VII). Elle est parvenue \u00e0 cette m\u00eame conclusion dans le cas o\u00f9 la proc\u00e9dure engag\u00e9e ne pr\u00e9voit pas la participation du requ\u00e9rant, mais uniquement le droit de celui-ci \u00e0 \u00eatre inform\u00e9 de l\u2019issue de la proc\u00e9dure m\u00eame (Jevremovi\u0107 c. Serbie, no 3150\/05, \u00a7 72, 17 juillet 2007). Enfin, elle a affirm\u00e9 que, en l\u2019absence de droit d\u2019appel, un recours hi\u00e9rarchique ne saurait avoir un effet significatif aux fins de l\u2019acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration de la proc\u00e9dure dans son ensemble (Lukenda c.\u00a0Slov\u00e9nie, no 23032\/02, \u00a7 63, CEDH 2005\u2011X).<\/p>\n 29. En l\u2019esp\u00e8ce, la Cour rel\u00e8ve que le Gouvernement n\u2019a pas d\u00e9montr\u00e9, \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re des crit\u00e8res rappel\u00e9s au paragraphe 28 ci-dessus, que le recours hi\u00e9rarchique \u00e9tait, tant en th\u00e9orie qu\u2019en pratique \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque des faits, \u00e0 m\u00eame d\u2019entra\u00eener une acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration des investigations pr\u00e9liminaires. En particulier, le Gouvernement n\u2019a pas r\u00e9ussi \u00e0 \u00e9tablir que ce rem\u00e8de reconnaissait \u00e0 la partie l\u00e9s\u00e9e un v\u00e9ritable droit personnel \u00e0 obtenir de l\u2019\u00c9tat l\u2019exercice de ses pouvoirs de surveillance, \u00e0 participer \u00e0 la proc\u00e9dure, \u00e0 \u00eatre inform\u00e9 de son issue et \u00e0 exercer un droit d\u2019appel contre la d\u00e9cision de refus d\u2019\u00e9voquer l\u2019enqu\u00eate. En effet, l\u2019arr\u00eat de la Cour de cassation no 19833 de 2009 rappelle seulement que le procureur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral a le pouvoir d\u2019\u00e9voquer l\u2019enqu\u00eate en vertu de l\u2019article 412 du CPP et affirme que le non-respect des d\u00e9lais pr\u00e9vus par l\u2019article 405 du CPP (paragraphe 14 ci\u2011dessus) n\u2019entra\u00eene pas une forclusion pour le procureur \u00e0 engager les poursuites p\u00e9nales. Par ailleurs, le Gouvernement ne fournit pas des \u00e9l\u00e9ments concluants d\u00e9montrant l\u2019effectivit\u00e9 de ce rem\u00e8de en pratique. Au contraire, la d\u00e9cision du CSM cit\u00e9e par le Gouvernement tendrait \u00e0 d\u00e9montrer l\u2019inverse, car elle reconna\u00eet ouvertement \u00ab\u00a0qu\u2019il [est] impossible pour les parquets g\u00e9n\u00e9raux de r\u00e9ussir \u00e0 \u00e9voquer toutes les enqu\u00eates pr\u00e9liminaires pour lesquelles les d\u00e9lais [sont] d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9chus\u00a0\u00bb et que \u00ab\u00a0les parquets g\u00e9n\u00e9raux n\u2019[ont] pas la possibilit\u00e9 mat\u00e9rielle d\u2019\u00e9voquer toutes les enqu\u00eates pr\u00e9liminaires pour lesquelles les d\u00e9lais [sont] \u00e9chus \u00bb. Ce constat ne saurait \u00eatre remis en cause au seul motif qu\u2019\u00e0 une seule occasion, le procureur g\u00e9n\u00e9ral pr\u00e8s la cour d\u2019appel de Brescia a rejet\u00e9 une demande d\u2019\u00e9vocation en raison du fait que l\u2019enqu\u00eate avait \u00e9t\u00e9 entretemps close par le procureur de premi\u00e8re instance.<\/p>\n 30. Par cons\u00e9quent, la Cour rejette cette exception.<\/p>\n b) Quant \u00e0 la voie de recours devant le juge civil<\/p>\n 31. Dans ses observations compl\u00e9mentaires et sur la satisfaction \u00e9quitable, le Gouvernement soutient \u00e9galement que le requ\u00e9rant aurait pu saisir les juridictions civiles aux fins de la protection de ses droits.<\/p>\n 32. La Cour rappelle que, aux termes de l\u2019article 55 de son r\u00e8glement, si la Partie contractante d\u00e9fenderesse entend soulever une exception d\u2019irrecevabilit\u00e9, elle doit le faire, pour autant que la nature de l\u2019exception et les circonstances le permettent, dans ses observations \u00e9crites ou orales sur la recevabilit\u00e9 de la requ\u00eate (N.C. c. Italie [GC], no 24952\/94, \u00a7 44, CEDH 2002-X). La Cour souligne qu\u2019une exception d\u2019irrecevabilit\u00e9 doit \u00eatre soulev\u00e9e par le Gouvernement de mani\u00e8re explicite et qu\u2019il ne lui incombe pas de la d\u00e9duire des arguments avanc\u00e9s par celui-ci (voir, mutatis mutandis,Navalnyy c. Russie [GC], nos 29580\/12 et 4 autres, \u00a7\u00a7 60-61, 15\u00a0novembre 2018, o\u00f9 le gouvernement d\u00e9fendeur n\u2019avait fait que dire, incidemment, en se penchant sur le fond d\u2019un grief, que le requ\u00e9rant n\u2019avait pas contest\u00e9 les mesures litigieuses dans le cadre des proc\u00e9dures internes, et Liblik et autres c. Estonie, nos 173\/15 et 5 autres, \u00a7 114, 28 mai 2019, o\u00f9 le gouvernement d\u00e9fendeur avait indiqu\u00e9 d\u2019autres voies de recours qui \u00e9taient offertes aux requ\u00e9rants mais n\u2019avait pas soulev\u00e9 d\u2019exception de non\u2011\u00e9puisement des voies de recours internes). S\u2019il en \u00e9tait autrement, la Cour viendrait \u00e0 enfreindre le principe d\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 des armes (voir, mutatis mutandis, Radomilja et autres c. Croatie [GC], nos 37685\/10 et 22768\/12, \u00a7\u00a0123, 20 mars 2018).<\/p>\n 33. La Cour observe, \u00e0 ce titre, que le Gouvernement a formellement soulev\u00e9 cette exception, pour la premi\u00e8re fois, dans ses observations compl\u00e9mentaires, et non pas dans ses observations initiales sur la recevabilit\u00e9 et sur le fond de l\u2019affaire dans la partie d\u00e9di\u00e9e aux exceptions de non-\u00e9puisement des voies de recours internes. Elle rel\u00e8ve, par ailleurs, que le Gouvernement n\u2019a fourni aucune explication \u00e0 cet atermoiement, et elle constate qu\u2019il n\u2019existait aucune circonstance exceptionnelle de nature \u00e0 l\u2019exon\u00e9rer de son obligation de soulever cette exception en temps utile. La Cour ne saurait non plus consid\u00e9rer comme une exception formelle de non\u2011\u00e9puisement des voies de recours la simple r\u00e9f\u00e9rence faite par le Gouvernement, dans ses premi\u00e8res observations, \u00e0 la possibilit\u00e9 pour le requ\u00e9rant de faire usage de la voie civile. En effet, cet \u00e9l\u00e9ment a \u00e9t\u00e9 soulev\u00e9 exclusivement dans le cadre de l\u2019exception concernant la comp\u00e9tence ratione materiae (paragraphe 20 ci\u2011dessus)\u00a0; or le Gouvernement n\u2019en a tir\u00e9 aucune exception d\u2019irrecevabilit\u00e9 pour d\u00e9faut d\u2019\u00e9puisement des voies de recours internes dans la partie correspondante de ce document. D\u00e8s lors, la Cour conclut que le Gouvernement est forclos, quant \u00e0 ce deuxi\u00e8me volet, \u00e0 exciper du non-\u00e9puisement des voies de recours internes (Khlaifia et autres c. Italie [GC], no 16483\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 52 et 53, 15 d\u00e9cembre 2016).<\/p>\n 34. La Cour rappelle, enfin, que dans l\u2019affaire Arnoldi (pr\u00e9cit\u00e9e, \u00a7 42, et voir le paragraphe 53 ci-dessous), elle a \u00e9tabli que la question concernant l\u2019existence d\u2019autres voies aptes \u00e0 prot\u00e9ger le droit de caract\u00e8re civil est \u00e0 examiner sous l\u2019angle de la proportionnalit\u00e9 des restrictions du droit d\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 un tribunal, et non pas sous celui de la recevabilit\u00e9.<\/p>\n 35. Partant, elle rejette \u00e9galement cette exception.<\/p>\n 36. Constatant que la requ\u00eate n\u2019est pas manifestement mal fond\u00e9e ni irrecevable pour un autre motif vis\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019article\u00a035 de la Convention, la Cour la d\u00e9clare recevable.<\/p>\n B. Sur le fond<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Sur la violation all\u00e9gu\u00e9e de l\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1 de la Convention \u00e0 raison de la dur\u00e9e de la proc\u00e9dure<\/em><\/p>\n 37. Le requ\u00e9rant soutient que la dur\u00e9e de la proc\u00e9dure a \u00e9t\u00e9 excessive.<\/p>\n 38. Le Gouvernement n\u2019a pas estim\u00e9 utile de pr\u00e9senter des observations sur le fond au motif que, selon lui, l\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1 n\u2019est, en tout \u00e9tat de cause, pas applicable en l\u2019esp\u00e8ce.<\/p>\n 39. La Cour souligne que la p\u00e9riode \u00e0 consid\u00e9rer dans le cadre d\u2019une proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale sous l\u2019angle du \u00ab\u00a0d\u00e9lai raisonnable\u00a0\u00bb de l\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1 d\u00e9bute, pour la personne qui se pr\u00e9tend l\u00e9s\u00e9e par une infraction, au moment o\u00f9 celle-ci exerce l\u2019un des droits et facult\u00e9s qui lui sont express\u00e9ment reconnus par la loi (Arnoldi, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7 48).<\/p>\n 40. En outre, la Cour rappelle que la dur\u00e9e raisonnable d\u2019une proc\u00e9dure doit s\u2019appr\u00e9cier suivant les circonstances de la cause et \u00e0 l\u2019aide des crit\u00e8res suivants : la complexit\u00e9 de l\u2019affaire, le comportement du requ\u00e9rant, celui des autorit\u00e9s comp\u00e9tentes, et l\u2019enjeu du litige pour l\u2019int\u00e9ress\u00e9 (Frydlender c.\u00a0France [GC], no 30979\/96, \u00a7 43, CEDH 2000-VII).<\/p>\n 41. En l\u2019esp\u00e8ce, la Cour constate que la p\u00e9riode \u00e0 prendre en compte a commenc\u00e9 le 28 juillet 2001, date du d\u00e9p\u00f4t de la plainte du requ\u00e9rant, pour s\u2019achever le 17 janvier 2007, date de la d\u00e9cision de classement sans suite adopt\u00e9e par le juge des investigations pr\u00e9liminaires de Salerne. Cette p\u00e9riode a donc dur\u00e9 cinq ans et six mois environ pour la seule phase des investigations pr\u00e9liminaires.<\/p>\n 42. De plus, la Cour constate que, selon les documents fournis par les parties, pendant la p\u00e9riode susmentionn\u00e9e, aucune activit\u00e9 d\u2019enqu\u00eate n\u2019a eu lieu, et que l\u2019affaire n\u2019\u00e9tait pas sp\u00e9cialement complexe.\u00a0Enfin, elle constate que le Gouvernement n\u2019a pas fourni d\u2019arguments \u00e0 m\u00eame de justifier des investigations pr\u00e9liminaires d\u2019une telle dur\u00e9e.<\/p>\n 43. Ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments suffisent \u00e0 la Cour pour conclure que, en l\u2019esp\u00e8ce, la dur\u00e9e de la proc\u00e9dure litigieuse a \u00e9t\u00e9 excessive et qu\u2019elle n\u2019a pas r\u00e9pondu \u00e0 l\u2019exigence du \u00ab d\u00e9lai raisonnable \u00bb. Partant, il y a eu violation de l\u2019article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 de la Convention.<\/p>\n 2. Sur la violation all\u00e9gu\u00e9e de l\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1 de la Convention \u00e0 raison d\u2019un d\u00e9faut d\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 un tribunal<\/em><\/p>\n 44. Le requ\u00e9rant se plaint \u00e9galement d\u2019une violation de l\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1 de la Convention \u00e0 raison d\u2019un d\u00e9faut d\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 un tribunal. En effet, la d\u00e9cision de classer l\u2019affaire sans suite pour cause de prescription de l\u2019action p\u00e9nale \u00e9tait due, \u00e0 son avis, \u00e0 l\u2019inaction du parquet, ce qui l\u2019aurait emp\u00each\u00e9 de se constituer partie civile et d\u2019obtenir la protection de ses droits de caract\u00e8re civil et l\u2019examen de sa demande de d\u00e9dommagement. Enfin, le fait de l\u2019obliger \u00e0 introduire par la suite une action devant les juridictions civiles aurait pu se r\u00e9v\u00e9ler inutilement st\u00e9rile et co\u00fbteux, notamment en cas d\u2019insolvabilit\u00e9 ult\u00e9rieure de la partie adverse.<\/p>\n 45. Le Gouvernement n\u2019a pas estim\u00e9 utile, une nouvelle fois, de pr\u00e9senter d\u2019observations sur le fond au motif que, selon lui, l\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1 n\u2019est, en tout \u00e9tat de cause, pas applicable en l\u2019esp\u00e8ce.<\/p>\n 46. La Cour estime que le grief concernant le d\u00e9faut d\u2019acc\u00e8s au tribunal pose une question distincte par rapport \u00e0 celle de la dur\u00e9e de la proc\u00e9dure et par cons\u00e9quent, conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 l\u2019approche suivie dans les arr\u00eats Atanasova c. Bulgarie (no 72001\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 47 et 57, 2 octobre 2008) et Tonchev c.\u00a0Bulgarie (no 18527\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 49 et 53, 19 novembre 2009), elle va l\u2019examiner s\u00e9par\u00e9ment.<\/p>\n 47. La Cour rappelle que toute personne dispose du droit \u00e0 ce qu\u2019un tribunal connaisse de ses contestations relatives \u00e0 ses droits et obligations de caract\u00e8re civil. C\u2019est ainsi que l\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1 de la Convention consacre le \u00ab\u00a0droit \u00e0 un tribunal \u00bb, dont le droit d\u2019acc\u00e8s, \u00e0 savoir le droit de saisir le tribunal en mati\u00e8re civile, ne constitue qu\u2019un aspect (Prince Hans\u2011Adam II de Liechtenstein c. Allemagne [GC], no 42527\/98, \u00a7 43, CEDH 2001-VIII, et Cudak c. Lituanie [GC], no 15869\/02, \u00a7 54, 23 mars 2010).<\/p>\n 48. La Cour pr\u00e9cise toutefois que ce droit n\u2019est pas absolu : il se pr\u00eate \u00e0 des limitations implicitement admises, car il commande, de par sa nature m\u00eame, une r\u00e9glementation par l\u2019\u00c9tat. Les \u00c9tats contractants jouissent en la mati\u00e8re d\u2019une certaine marge d\u2019appr\u00e9ciation. Il appartient cependant \u00e0 la Cour de statuer en dernier ressort sur le respect des exigences de la Convention ; la Cour doit se convaincre ainsi que les limitations mises en \u0153uvre ne restreignent pas l\u2019acc\u00e8s offert \u00e0 l\u2019individu d\u2019une mani\u00e8re ou \u00e0 un point tels que ce droit s\u2019en trouve atteint dans sa substance m\u00eame. En outre, pareille limitation ne se concilie avec l\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1 de la Convention que si elle tend \u00e0 un but l\u00e9gitime et s\u2019il existe un rapport raisonnable de proportionnalit\u00e9 entre les moyens employ\u00e9s et le but vis\u00e9 (Waite et Kennedy c. Allemagne [GC], no 26083\/94, \u00a7 59, CEDH 1999-I). En effet, le droit d\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 un tribunal se trouve atteint lorsque sa r\u00e9glementation cesse de servir les buts de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 juridique et de la bonne administration de la justice et constitue une sorte de barri\u00e8re qui emp\u00eache le justiciable de voir son litige tranch\u00e9 au fond par la juridiction comp\u00e9tente (Tsalkitzis c. Gr\u00e8ce, no\u00a011801\/04, \u00a7 44, 16 novembre 2006). Dans l\u2019affaire Zubac c. Croatie ([GC], no 40160\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 90 et 95, 5 avril 2018), la Cour a rappel\u00e9 que lorsqu\u2019une erreur proc\u00e9durale emp\u00eache le requ\u00e9rant d\u2019acc\u00e9der \u00e0 un tribunal, elle a habituellement tendance \u00e0 faire peser la charge sur celui qui a commis cette erreur. Elle a ajout\u00e9, dans cette m\u00eame affaire, qu\u2019une restriction \u00e0 l\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 un tribunal est disproportionn\u00e9e quand l\u2019irrecevabilit\u00e9 d\u2019un recours r\u00e9sulte de l\u2019imputation au requ\u00e9rant d\u2019une faute dont celui-ci n\u2019est objectivement pas responsable.<\/p>\n 49. La Cour rappelle que, dans des affaires o\u00f9 \u00e9tait en cause l\u2019absence d\u2019examen au fond de constitutions de partie civile \u00e0 raison de l\u2019irrecevabilit\u00e9 des plaintes p\u00e9nales auxquelles elles \u00e9taient jointes, elle a attach\u00e9 de l\u2019importance \u00e0 l\u2019accessibilit\u00e9 et \u00e0 l\u2019effectivit\u00e9 des autres voies judiciaires ouvertes aux int\u00e9ress\u00e9s pour faire valoir leurs pr\u00e9tentions, notamment des actions disponibles devant les juridictions civiles (Forum Maritime S.A. c. Roumanie, nos 63610\/00 et 38692\/5, \u00a7 91, 4 octobre 2007). Dans les cas o\u00f9 elle a consid\u00e9r\u00e9 que les requ\u00e9rants disposaient effectivement de pareils recours, elle a alors conclu \u00e0 l\u2019absence de violation du droit d\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 un tribunal (Assenov et autres c. Bulgarie, no 24760\/94, \u00a7 112, Recueil des arr\u00eats et d\u00e9cisions 1998\u2013VIII, Ernst et autres c. Belgique, no\u00a033400\/96, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a053-55, 15 juillet 2003, Moldovan et autres c. Roumanie (no\u00a02), no\u00a041138\/98 et 64320\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 119-122, 12 juillet 2005, LacerdaGouveia et autres c. Portugal, no 11868\/07, \u00a7 80, 1er mars 2011, et Nicolae VirgiliuT\u0103nase c. Roumanie [GC], no 41720\/13, \u00a7 198, 25 juin 2019).<\/p>\n 50. En particulier, la Cour n\u2019a pas conclu \u00e0 la violation de l\u2019article 6 de la Convention dans le cas o\u00f9 les poursuites p\u00e9nales n\u2019avaient pas \u00e9t\u00e9 men\u00e9es ou avaient \u00e9t\u00e9 abandonn\u00e9es en raison du fait\u00a0: qu\u2019aucune infraction p\u00e9nale n\u2019avait \u00e9t\u00e9 constat\u00e9e (Georgi Georgiev c. Bulgarie (d\u00e9c.), no 34137\/03, 11\u00a0janvier 2011, Assenov et autres, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7\u00a7 22-23, Moldovan et autres, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7\u00a7 36-37, Forum Maritime S.A., pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7 30, et Manolea et autres c.\u00a0Roumanie (d\u00e9c.),no 58162\/14, \u00a7 23, 15 septembre 2020), ou que la proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale s\u2019\u00e9tait achev\u00e9e en application d\u2019un accord de \u00ab plaider coupable \u00bb (Nikolov c. Bulgarie (V) (d\u00e9c.), no 39672\/03, 28 septembre 2010) ou d\u2019un privil\u00e8ge de juridiction (Ernst et autres, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7 49) ou en raison du d\u00e9c\u00e8s de l\u2019accus\u00e9 (Manolea et autres, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7 23). Il en est all\u00e9 de m\u00eame pour les affaires o\u00f9 le requ\u00e9rant avait d\u00e9j\u00e0 saisi, en parall\u00e8le, le juge civil et obtenu un examen sur le fond avant l\u2019abandon des poursuites (S.O.S. racisme \u2013 Touche pas \u00e0 mon pote c. Belgique (d\u00e9c.) no 26341\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a030-34, 12 janvier 2016, et, mutatis mutandis, Borobar et autres c.\u00a0Roumanie, no 5663\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 59-60, 29 janvier 2013).<\/p>\n 51. En revanche, dans d\u2019autres d\u2019affaires, la Cour a conclu \u00e0 la violation de l\u2019article 6 de la Convention lorsque la cl\u00f4ture des poursuites p\u00e9nales et le d\u00e9faut d\u2019examen de l\u2019action civile \u00e9taient dus \u00e0 des circonstances attribuables principalement aux autorit\u00e9s judiciaires, notamment \u00e0 des retards excessifs de proc\u00e9dure ayant entra\u00een\u00e9 la prescription de l\u2019infraction p\u00e9nale (Anagnostopoulos c. Gr\u00e8ce, no 54589\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 31-32, 3 avril 2003, Tonchev, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7\u00a7 50-53, Gousis c.\u00a0Gr\u00e8ce, no\u00a08863\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 34-35, 29 mars 2007, Atanasova, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7\u00a7 35-47, Dinchev c. Bulgarie, no 23057\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 40-52, 22\u00a0janvier 2009, Boris Stojanovski c. l\u2019ex-R\u00e9publique yougoslave de Mac\u00e9doine, no 41916\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 56-57, 6 mai 2010, Rokas c. Gr\u00e8ce, no\u00a055081\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 22-24, 22 septembre 2015, et Korkolis c. Gr\u00e8ce, no\u00a063300\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 21-25, 15 janvier 2015\u00a0; voir, a contrario, LacerdaGouveia et autres, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7 77, Dimitras c. Gr\u00e8ce, no 11946\/11, \u00a7 47, 19 avril 2018 et Nicolae VirgiliuT\u0103nase, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7\u00a7 196-202 et 207-214 o\u00f9 la Cour a constat\u00e9 l\u2019absence de responsabilit\u00e9 des autorit\u00e9s dans le d\u00e9roulement de la proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale, concluant ainsi \u00e0 la non-violation de l\u2019article 6 sous l\u2019angle du droit d\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 un tribunal et de la dur\u00e9e de la proc\u00e9dure).<\/p>\n 52. En l\u2019esp\u00e8ce, la Cour constate que le requ\u00e9rant avait fait usage des droits et facult\u00e9s qui lui \u00e9taient ouverts en droit interne dans le cadre de la proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale et qui lui auraient permis, au moment de l\u2019audience pr\u00e9liminaire, de demander r\u00e9paration du pr\u00e9judice civil dont il se disait victime. En l\u2019occurrence, c\u2019est exclusivement en raison du retard avec lequel les autorit\u00e9s de poursuite ont trait\u00e9 le dossier et de la prescription de l\u2019infraction d\u00e9nonc\u00e9e que le requ\u00e9rant n\u2019a pas pu pr\u00e9senter sa demande de d\u00e9dommagement (paragraphe 11 ci-dessus) et que, par cons\u00e9quent, il n\u2019a pas pu voir statuer sur cette demande dans le cadre de la proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale (Atanasova, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7 45, et Dragomirc. Croatie [comit\u00e9], no 43045\/08, \u00a7\u00a048, 14 juin 2016).<\/p>\n 53. La Cour en conclut, \u00e0 l\u2019instar de ce qu\u2019elle a jug\u00e9 dans les affaires cit\u00e9es au paragraphe 51 ci\u2011dessus, que ce comportement fautif des autorit\u00e9s a eu pour cons\u00e9quence de priver le requ\u00e9rant de voir ses pr\u00e9tentions de caract\u00e8re civil tranch\u00e9es dans le cadre de la proc\u00e9dure qu\u2019il avait choisi de poursuivre et qui \u00e9tait mise \u00e0 sa disposition par l\u2019ordre juridique interne. En effet, l\u2019on ne saurait exiger d\u2019un justiciable qu\u2019il introduise une action aux m\u00eames fins en responsabilit\u00e9 civile devant la juridiction civile apr\u00e8s le constat de prescription de l\u2019action p\u00e9nale en raison de la faute de la juridiction p\u00e9nale (voir, mutatis mutandis, Anagnostopoulos, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7 32). \u00c0 cet \u00e9gard, la Cour rel\u00e8ve, en particulier, que l\u2019engagement d\u2019une telle action impliquerait probablement la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de rassembler de nouveau des preuves, que le requ\u00e9rant aurait d\u00e9sormais la charge de produire, et que l\u2019\u00e9tablissement de l\u2019\u00e9ventuelle responsabilit\u00e9 civile pourrait s\u2019av\u00e9rer extr\u00eamement difficile autant de temps apr\u00e8s les faits (Atanasova, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7\u00a046).<\/p>\n 54. Partant, il y a eu violation de l\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1 de la Convention.<\/p>\n II. SUR LA VIOLATION ALL\u00c9GU\u00c9E DE L\u2019ARTICLE 13 DE LA CONVENTION \u00c0 RAISON D\u2019UNE ABSENCE DE RECOURS EFFECTIF PERMETTANT DE SE PLAINDRE DE LA DUR\u00c9E DE LA PROC\u00c9DURE<\/p>\n 55. Le requ\u00e9rant se plaint d\u2019une absence d\u2019effectivit\u00e9 du recours fond\u00e9 sur la \u00ab\u00a0loi Pinto\u00a0\u00bb, en avan\u00e7ant notamment pour motif que, en raison de la jurisprudence bien \u00e9tablie de la Cour de cassation, la partie l\u00e9s\u00e9e qui ne s\u2019est pas constitu\u00e9e partie civile ne peut pas introduire ce recours. Il invoque l\u2019article 13 de la Convention, ainsi libell\u00e9\u00a0:<\/p>\n \u00ab\u00a0Toute personne dont les droits et libert\u00e9s reconnus dans la (…) Convention ont \u00e9t\u00e9 viol\u00e9s, a droit \u00e0 l\u2019octroi d\u2019un recours effectif devant une instance nationale, alors m\u00eame que la violation aurait \u00e9t\u00e9 commise par des personnes agissant dans l\u2019exercice de leurs fonctions officielles.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n A. Th\u00e8ses des parties<\/strong><\/p>\n 56. Le Gouvernement consid\u00e8re que le grief tir\u00e9 de l\u2019article 13 doit \u00eatre d\u00e9clar\u00e9 incompatible ratione materiae avec les dispositions de la Convention au motif que, selon lui, l\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1 n\u2019est pas applicable en l\u2019esp\u00e8ce. Il ne se prononce pas quant au fond du grief.<\/p>\n 57. Le requ\u00e9rant estime que, en raison de la jurisprudence bien \u00e9tablie de la Cour de cassation, il ne pouvait pas introduire le recours \u00ab\u00a0Pinto\u00a0\u00bb parce qu\u2019il n\u2019avait pas pu se constituer partie civile.<\/p>\n B. Appr\u00e9ciation de la Cour<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Sur la recevabilit\u00e9<\/em><\/p>\n 58. La Cour rappelle que l\u2019article 13 de la Convention garantit l\u2019existence en droit interne d\u2019un recours permettant de se pr\u00e9valoir des droits et libert\u00e9s de la Convention tels qu\u2019ils y sont consacr\u00e9s. Cette disposition a donc pour cons\u00e9quence d\u2019exiger un recours interne habilitant \u00e0 examiner le contenu d\u2019un \u00ab grief d\u00e9fendable \u00bb fond\u00e9 sur la Convention et \u00e0 en offrir le redressement appropri\u00e9 (De Souza Ribeiro c. France [GC], no\u00a022689\/07, \u00a7 78, 13 d\u00e9cembre 2012).<\/p>\n 59. En l\u2019esp\u00e8ce, la Cour vient de conclure que l\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1 \u00e9tait applicable (paragraphes 22-23 ci-dessus) et elle a constat\u00e9 la violation de cette disposition notamment \u00e0 raison de la dur\u00e9e excessive de la proc\u00e9dure (paragraphes 39-43 ci-dessus). Il s\u2019ensuit que le requ\u00e9rant disposait d\u2019un grief d\u00e9fendable sous l\u2019angle de l\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1, et que l\u2019article 13 de la Convention trouve \u00e0 s\u2019appliquer en l\u2019esp\u00e8ce.<\/p>\n 60. Constatant que ce grief n\u2019est pas manifestement mal fond\u00e9 au sens de l\u2019article 35 \u00a7 3 a) de la Convention et qu\u2019il ne se heurte \u00e0 aucun autre motif d\u2019irrecevabilit\u00e9, la Cour le d\u00e9clare recevable.<\/p>\n 2. Sur le fond<\/em><\/p>\n 61. La Cour observe que les principes qui se d\u00e9gagent de l\u2019article 2 alin\u00e9a 2 bis de la loi no 89 de 2001 et de la jurisprudence interne consolid\u00e9e en la mati\u00e8re confirment l\u2019inapplicabilit\u00e9 du recours \u00ab\u00a0Pinto\u00a0\u00bb \u00e0 la partie l\u00e9s\u00e9e qui n\u2019a pas pu se constituer partie civile dans une proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale (paragraphes 10 et 12 ci\u2011dessus).<\/p>\n 62. Ainsi, la Cour estime qu\u2019il y a eu violation de l\u2019article 13 de la Convention \u00e0 raison de l\u2019absence en droit interne d\u2019un recours permettant au requ\u00e9rant d\u2019obtenir la sanction de son droit \u00e0 voir sa cause entendue dans un d\u00e9lai raisonnable, au sens de l\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1 de la Convention (voir, mutatis mutandis, Xenos c.\u00a0Gr\u00e8ce, no45225\/09, \u00a7 44, 13 juillet 2017, et Cipolletta c.\u00a0Italie, no 38259\/09, \u00a7 49, 11 janvier 2018).<\/p>\n III. SUR LES AUTRES VIOLATIONS ALL\u00c9GU\u00c9ES DE LA CONVENTION<\/p>\n 63. Enfin, le requ\u00e9rant invoque \u00e9galement, \u00e0 l\u2019appui de ses all\u00e9gations, l\u2019article 8 de la Convention et l\u2019article 6 de la Convention combin\u00e9 avec l\u2019article 14 de la Convention.<\/p>\n 64. La Cour consid\u00e8re que ces griefs sont absorb\u00e9s par les griefs tir\u00e9s des articles 6 et 13 de la Convention et elle estime qu\u2019il n\u2019est pas n\u00e9cessaire de les examiner s\u00e9par\u00e9ment.<\/p>\n IV. SUR L\u2019APPLICATION DE L\u2019ARTICLE 41 DE LA CONVENTION<\/p>\n 65. Aux termes de l\u2019article 41 de la Convention\u00a0:<\/p>\n \u00ab\u00a0Si la Cour d\u00e9clare qu\u2019il y a eu violation de la Convention ou de ses Protocoles, et si le droit interne de la Haute Partie contractante ne permet d\u2019effacer qu\u2019imparfaitement les cons\u00e9quences de cette violation, la Cour accorde \u00e0 la partie l\u00e9s\u00e9e, s\u2019il y a lieu, une satisfaction \u00e9quitable.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n A. Dommage<\/strong><\/p>\n 66. Le requ\u00e9rant demande 500\u00a0000 euros (EUR) au titre du dommage moral qu\u2019il dit avoir subi.<\/p>\n 67. Le Gouvernement conteste cette pr\u00e9tention et consid\u00e8re la somme r\u00e9clam\u00e9e excessive.<\/p>\n 68. La Cour estime qu\u2019il y a lieu d\u2019octroyer au requ\u00e9rant 5\u00a0200 EUR pour dommage moral, plus tout montant pouvant \u00eatre d\u00fb sur cette somme \u00e0 titre d\u2019imp\u00f4t.<\/p>\n B. Frais et d\u00e9pens<\/strong><\/p>\n 69. Le requ\u00e9rant sollicite 27\u00a0727,20 EUR au titre des frais et d\u00e9pens qu\u2019il a engag\u00e9s aux fins de la proc\u00e9dure men\u00e9e devant la Cour.<\/p>\n 70. Le Gouvernement conteste cette pr\u00e9tention et consid\u00e8re la somme r\u00e9clam\u00e9e excessive.<\/p>\n 71. Selon la jurisprudence de la Cour, un requ\u00e9rant ne peut obtenir le remboursement de ses frais et d\u00e9pens que dans la mesure o\u00f9 se trouvent \u00e9tablis leur r\u00e9alit\u00e9, leur n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 et le caract\u00e8re raisonnable de leur taux. En l\u2019esp\u00e8ce, compte tenu des documents dont elle dispose et des crit\u00e8res susmentionn\u00e9s, la Cour juge raisonnable d\u2019allouer au requ\u00e9rant la somme de 2\u00a0000 EUR pour la proc\u00e9dure men\u00e9e devant elle, plus tout montant pouvant \u00eatre d\u00fb sur cette somme par l\u2019int\u00e9ress\u00e9 \u00e0 titre d\u2019imp\u00f4t.<\/p>\n C. Int\u00e9r\u00eats moratoires<\/strong><\/p>\n 72. La Cour juge appropri\u00e9 de calquer le taux des int\u00e9r\u00eats moratoires sur le taux d\u2019int\u00e9r\u00eat de la facilit\u00e9 de pr\u00eat marginal de la Banque centrale europ\u00e9enne major\u00e9 de trois points de pourcentage.<\/p>\n PAR CES MOTIFS, LA COUR,<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. D\u00e9clare, \u00e0 l\u2019unanimit\u00e9, la requ\u00eate recevable\u00a0;<\/p>\n 2. Dit, \u00e0 l\u2019unanimit\u00e9, qu\u2019il y a eu violation de l\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1 de la Convention \u00e0 raison de la dur\u00e9e de la proc\u00e9dure\u00a0;<\/p>\n 3. Dit, parcinqvoix contre deux qu\u2019il y a eu violation de l\u2019article 6 \u00a7 1 de la Convention \u00e0 raison d\u2019une atteinte au droit d\u2019acc\u00e8s du requ\u00e9rant \u00e0 un tribunal\u00a0;<\/p>\n 4. Dit, l\u2019unanimit\u00e9, qu\u2019il y a eu violation de l\u2019article 13 de la Convention\u00a0;<\/p>\n 5. Dit, l\u2019unanimit\u00e9, qu\u2019il n\u2019y a pas lieu d\u2019examiner s\u00e9par\u00e9ment les griefs formul\u00e9s sur le terrain de l\u2019article 8 de la Convention et de l\u2019article\u00a06 \u00a7 1 de la Convention combin\u00e9 avec l\u2019article 14 de la Convention\u00a0;<\/p>\n 6. Dit\u00e0 l\u2019unanimit\u00e9,<\/p>\n a) que l\u2019\u00c9tat d\u00e9fendeur doit verser au requ\u00e9rant, dans un d\u00e9lai de trois mois \u00e0 compter de la date \u00e0 laquelle l\u2019arr\u00eat sera devenu d\u00e9finitif conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 l\u2019article\u00a044\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 de la Convention, les sommes suivantes :<\/p>\n i. 5\u00a0200 EUR (cinq mille deux cents euros), plus tout montant pouvant \u00eatre d\u00fb sur cette somme \u00e0 titre d\u2019imp\u00f4t, pour dommage moral,<\/p>\n ii. 2\u00a0000 EUR (deux mille euros), plus tout montant pouvant \u00eatre d\u00fb sur cette somme par le requ\u00e9rant \u00e0 titre d\u2019imp\u00f4t, pour frais et d\u00e9pens,<\/p>\n b) qu\u2019\u00e0 compter de l\u2019expiration dudit d\u00e9lai et jusqu\u2019au versement, ces montants seront \u00e0 majorer d\u2019un int\u00e9r\u00eat simple \u00e0 un taux \u00e9gal \u00e0 celui de la facilit\u00e9 de pr\u00eat marginal de la Banque centrale europ\u00e9enne applicable pendant cette p\u00e9riode, augment\u00e9 de trois points de pourcentage\u00a0;<\/p>\n 7. Rejette \u00e0 l\u2019unanimit\u00e9,la demande de satisfaction \u00e9quitable pour le surplus.<\/p>\n Fait en fran\u00e7ais, puis communiqu\u00e9 par \u00e9crit le 18 mars 2021, en application de l\u2019article\u00a077\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 et\u00a03 du r\u00e8glement.<\/p>\n Renata Degener\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Ksenija Turkovi\u0107 __________<\/p>\n Au pr\u00e9sent arr\u00eat se trouve joint, conform\u00e9ment aux articles 45 \u00a7 2 de la Convention et 74 \u00a7 2 du r\u00e8glement, l\u2019expos\u00e9 des opinions s\u00e9par\u00e9es suivantes\u00a0:<\/p>\n \u2013 opinion en partie dissidente du juge Wojtyczek\u00a0;<\/p>\n \u2013 opinion en partie dissidente du juge Sabato.<\/p>\n K.T.U. OPINION EN PARTIE DISSIDENTE DU JUGE WOJTYCZEK<\/strong><\/p>\n 1. Je ne partage pas l\u2019avis de la majorit\u00e9 selon lequel il y a eu violation de l\u2019article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01 de la Convention \u00e0 raison d\u2019une atteinte au droit d\u2019acc\u00e8s du requ\u00e9rant \u00e0 un tribunal. Sur cette question, je suis d\u2019accord avec les principaux arguments expos\u00e9s, avec brio, par le juge Sabato.<\/p>\n 2. Dans la pr\u00e9sente opinion, je souhaite ajouter tr\u00e8s bri\u00e8vement les points suivants. Si j\u2019ai vot\u00e9 en faveur d\u2019un constat de violation de l\u2019article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01 de la Convention \u00e0 raison de la dur\u00e9e de la proc\u00e9dure, je l\u2019ai fait avec beaucoup d\u2019h\u00e9sitations. Dans la plupart des affaires dans lesquelles la Cour a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 l\u2019article\u00a06 applicable aux pr\u00e9tentions de droit civil qui avaient \u00e9t\u00e9 soulev\u00e9es dans une proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale, l\u2019acc\u00e8s au juge civil \u00e9tait ferm\u00e9 de iure ou de facto pendant la dur\u00e9e de la proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale. Dans un tel cas de figure, les retards dans la proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale retardent l\u2019obtention de l\u2019arr\u00eat de fond sur la question civile. Or, comme l\u2019explique le juge Sabato, en droit italien, l\u2019acc\u00e8s au juge civil est ouvert pendant la proc\u00e9dure p\u00e9nale.<\/p>\n 3. La majorit\u00e9 pr\u00e9sente son principal argument en faveur de la violation de l\u2019article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01 \u00e0 raison d\u2019une atteinte au droit d\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 un tribunal de la mani\u00e8re suivante (paragraphe\u00a053 de l\u2019arr\u00eat)\u00a0:<\/p>\n En effet, l\u2019on ne saurait exiger d\u2019un justiciable qu\u2019il introduise une action aux m\u00eames fins en responsabilit\u00e9 civile devant la juridiction civile apr\u00e8s le constat de prescription de l\u2019action p\u00e9nale en raison de la faute de la juridiction p\u00e9nale (voir, mutatis mutandis, Anagnostopoulos, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7\u00a032). \u00c0 cet \u00e9gard, la Cour rel\u00e8ve, en particulier, que l\u2019engagement d\u2019une telle action impliquerait probablement la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de rassembler de nouveau des preuves, que le requ\u00e9rant aurait d\u00e9sormais la charge de produire, et que l\u2019\u00e9tablissement de l\u2019\u00e9ventuelle responsabilit\u00e9 civile pourrait s\u2019av\u00e9rer extr\u00eamement difficile autant de temps apr\u00e8s les faits (Atanasova, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7\u00a046).<\/p>\n Je ne vois pas pourquoi on ne saurait exiger d\u2019un justiciable qu\u2019il introduise une action en responsabilit\u00e9 civile devant la juridiction civile apr\u00e8s le constat de prescription de l\u2019action p\u00e9nale. Je note par ailleurs, que la pr\u00e9sente affaire concerne la protection de la r\u00e9putation. En g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, les litiges civils concernant la r\u00e9putation ne sont pas particuli\u00e8rement compliqu\u00e9s factuellement. De plus, dans beaucoup de syst\u00e8mes juridiques, la charge de prouver la v\u00e9racit\u00e9 des all\u00e9gations affectant les droits de la personnalit\u00e9 incombe au d\u00e9fendeur. Dans la pr\u00e9sente affaire, rassembler les preuves et \u00e9tablir la responsabilit\u00e9 civile n\u2019appara\u00eet pas comme une t\u00e2che particuli\u00e8rement difficile pour le demandeur. L\u2019approche de la majorit\u00e9, qui consiste \u00e0 mettre en exergue les difficult\u00e9s habituelles \u00e0 plaider dans une affaire civile, semble remettre en cause l\u2019id\u00e9e m\u00eame de proc\u00e8s civil fond\u00e9 sur le principe actoriincumbitonusprobandi et sur l\u2019\u00e9galit\u00e9 des armes entre les parties.<\/p>\n 4. Je note par ailleurs que la pr\u00e9sente affaire concerne non seulement la protection de la r\u00e9putation mais aussi la libert\u00e9 d\u2019expression de la partie adverse. La majorit\u00e9 encourage implicitement l\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 la justice p\u00e9nale comme voie privil\u00e9gi\u00e9e, car plus facile, pour assurer la protection du droit civil \u00e0 la r\u00e9putation. Une telle approche n\u2019est pas sans poser de probl\u00e8mes.<\/p>\n PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SABATO<\/strong><\/p>\n I. INTRODUCTION<\/p>\n 1. With some hesitations (which I will explain in part V of this opinion) I voted with the majority in finding a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) because of the excessive length of the proceedings in the present case (Petrella[2]). I also concurred in finding a violation of Article 13. I was, on the contrary, unable to agree to the finding by the majority of a violation of the same provision of Article 6 \u00a7 1 on account of an alleged infringement of the applicant\u2019s right of access to a court.<\/p>\n 2. I believe that this latter finding by the majority introduces a development which departs from the previous prevailing case-law of the Court, as validated by the Grand Chamber. Moreover, I consider this development to be not only \u2013 respectfully \u2013 incorrect, but also dangerous, since it brings about a confusion of concepts and errors in the perception of Convention guarantees that \u2013 as is well known \u2013 are counterproductive and even fatal for an effective protection of rights and liberties under the Convention (see part VI below).<\/p>\n 3. This opinion seeks, therefore, to highlight the serious questions concerning the application of the Convention that the majority\u2019s approach raises (see conclusions in part VII below).<\/p>\n II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO A COURT AND THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO A REASONABLE LENGTH OF PROCEEDINGS<\/p>\n A. The Golder concepts<\/strong><\/p>\n 4. As is widely known, Article 6 of the Convention does not explicitly guarantee a right of access to a court. The enunciation of such a right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters (and only in civil matters) derives from the Court\u2019s interpretation of Article 6: in the leading judgment of Golder v. the United Kingdom (21 February 1975, \u00a7\u00a028, Series A no. 18), the Court held:<\/p>\n \u201c… Article 6 para. 1 does not state a right of access to the courts or tribunals in express terms [but rather] rights which are distinct but stem from the same basic idea and which, taken together, make up a single right not specifically defined in the narrower sense of the term. It is the duty of the Court to ascertain, by means of interpretation, whether access to the courts constitutes one factor or aspect of this [single] right\u201d.<\/p>\n 5. The reasoning in Golder is complex, including consideration of basic principles of interpretation of treaties, extending over paragraphs 29-36 of the judgment.<\/p>\n 6. In so far as the present case is concerned, it may suffice to recall that in Golder (\u00a7 36) the Court concluded:<\/p>\n \u201c… Article 6 para. 1 secures to everyone the right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal. In this way the Article embodies the \u2018right to a court\u2019, of which the right of access, that is the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters, constitutes one aspect only. To this are added the guarantees laid down by Article 6 para. 1 as regards both the organisation and composition of the court, and the conduct of the proceedings. In sum, the whole makes up the right to a fair hearing.\u201d<\/p>\n It may be important to emphasise that the Court left open the issue as to<\/p>\n \u201cwhether and to what extent Article 6 para. 1 further require[d] a decision on the very substance of the dispute.\u201d<\/p>\n 7. The relationship between the several components of the all-encompassing \u201cright to a fair hearing\u201d (to which the Court also refers as a broad \u201cright to a court\u201d) is clearly depicted in paragraph 35 of Golder: the Convention \u201cfirst protect[s] that which alone makes it in fact possible to benefit from … guarantees, that is, access to a court\u201d[3]; then \u201cafford[s] to parties in a pending lawsuit\u201d some \u201cprocedural guarantees\u201d which the Article \u201cdescribe[s] in detail\u201d. What is most relevant, is that \u201c[t]he fair, public and expeditious characteristics of judicial proceedings\u201d, i.e., the detailed procedural guarantees for all parties to pending proceedings enunciated explicitly in Article 6, \u201care of no value at all if there are no judicial proceedings\u201d, i.e., if the right of access is not afforded to the claimant.<\/p>\n 8. I consider that the Court should always be mindful of such a brilliant construction which, in my opinion, does not lend itself to misunderstanding, nor \u2013 to my knowledge \u2013 has it ever been reconsidered by the Court. Furthermore, the right of access to a court has become very well known and a subject of reflection by scholarly work, domestic judiciaries and human rights agencies. A successful handbook on access to justice in Europe (whose component of access to a court is very relevant) has been jointly prepared by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and the Council of Europe together with the Registry of the Court[4]; a number of courses on access to justice \u2013 again having access to a court as a core element \u2013 are successfully offered to European legal professionals by the HELP programme of the Council of Europe[5]. In sum, access to a court is an important legacy from Golder.<\/p>\n 9. In Petrella I fear that the majority became oblivious to the Golder concepts: based on Golder, within the wider right to a fair hearing (or \u201cto a court\u201d), the Court has established a clear ranking of protections. First, the Court must verify that the component \u201cright of access to a court\u201d has been respected; if \u201cthere are no judicial proceedings\u201d (the right of access is defined synonymically as a right to have a claim \u201cbrought before a court or tribunal\u201d or as a right \u201cto institute proceedings before courts in civil matters\u201d), respect for the component related to \u201cprocedural guarantees\u201d, which the Article \u201cdescribe[s] in detail\u201d (and which cover, among other aspects, \u201c[t]he … expeditious characteristics of judicial proceedings\u201d), need not be assessed. If, on the contrary, access has been ensured, then procedural details must be verified by the Court, as the guarantees are \u201cafforded to parties in a pending lawsuit\u201d, while they \u201care of no value at all if there are no judicial proceedings\u201d.<\/p>\n 10. The right of access to a court is applicable only to the determination of a victim\u2019s civil rights and obligations (in fact, the right to have third parties prosecuted or sentenced for a criminal offence cannot be asserted independently: it must be indissociable from the victim\u2019s exercise of a right to bring civil proceedings in domestic law (see Perez v. France [GC], no.\u00a047287\/99, \u00a7 70, 12 February 2004)); moreover, the component rights of the procedural guarantees are different between the civil and criminal law areas; the right to a reasonable timeframe applies, however, to both civil and criminal proceedings.<\/p>\n B. The conflict between Commission and Court in Matos e Silva and the \u201ccommon basis\u201d for their positions<\/strong><\/p>\n 11. After the Golder case-law became established (and this took place remarkably through Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a057 et seq., Series A no. 93, where no violation of the right of access was found), a decade elapsed before the Court was called upon to decide on the specific topic under scrutiny in the present case: can the Court, at the same time, find a denial of access to a court and an excessive length of proceedings? The question is dealt with through different approaches, but they have \u2013 as I will try to show \u2013 a common basis: just like European languages offer a remarkable series of proverbs emphasising the impossibility of obtaining simultaneously incompatible results of human actions[6], almost with no exception (Petrella might be, if it becomes final, one out of three) the answer by the Court is that violations for a denial of access to a court and for an excessive length of proceedings cannot coexist.<\/p>\n 12. In Matos e Silva, Lda., and Others v. Portugal (16 September 1996, Reports 1996\u2011IV) the Commission had been confronted with complaints simultaneously proposed on the \u201cgrounds of a lack of effective access to a tribunal\u201d and \u201con the grounds of the length of proceedings\u201d (\u00a7 68 of the Commission\u2019s Opinion, Report of 21 February 1995); in addition, a complaint under Article 13 had been made. Proceedings had been stayed for years before the Portuguese Supreme Administrative Court, since the administrative file had been requested from the Government, but no transmission had taken place.<\/p>\n 13. The Commission found that \u201ca hindrance in fact [might] contravene the Convention just as much as an impediment in law\u201d, and that the obstacle at issue was a \u201cmajor hindrance to the effective exercise of the applicants\u2019 … right of access to a court\u201d (\u00a7\u00a7 80-83 of the Opinion). Having found a violation of the right of access (\u201c[i]n the light of … the conclusion set out in paragraph 83 above …\u201d), the Commission considered that it [was] not necessary to examine, in addition, the applicants\u2019 complaint relating to the length of the proceedings at issue\u201d and concluded that \u201cno separate question [arose] … in relation to the length of proceedings\u201d (\u00a7\u00a7 88-89 of the Opinion).<\/p>\n 14. When the case reached the Chamber, the Court took a different position, somehow going back to the Golder concepts (see above in this opinion, \u00a7 II.A): it was not the right of access to a court that had been infringed, but the right to a reasonable length of proceedings:<\/p>\n \u201c64. In the Court\u2019s view, no question of hindering access to a tribunal arises where a litigant, represented by a lawyer, freely brings proceedings in a court, makes his submissions to it and lodges such appeals against its decisions as he considers appropriate. As the Government rightly pointed out, Matos e Silva have used the remedies available under Portuguese law. The fact that the proceedings are taking a long time does not concern access to a tribunal. The difficulties encountered thus relate to conduct of proceedings, not to access.<\/p>\n In short, there has been no violation of Article 13 or, in this regard, of Article 6 para. 1, the requirements of the former being moreover less strict than, and here absorbed by, those of the latter.\u201d<\/p>\n 15. As I have already said, what in my view matters most is the common basis for both the Commission\u2019s and the Court\u2019s approaches: simultaneous violations on both grounds \u2013 access and length \u2013 are not possible. To repeat the Court\u2019s formulation in Matos e Silva: \u201cThe fact that the proceedings are taking a long time does not concern access to a tribunal. The difficulties encountered … relate to conduct of proceedings, not to access\u201d. Of course, the Commission had taken the opposite position, but what is crucial is that for both bodies no co-existence of violations was possible.<\/p>\n 16. For the purpose of this opinion (i.e., to illustrate the fact that the majority in Petrella have unexpectedly been unfaithful to the Court\u2019s well established case-law, and have followed erratic precedents), I do not need to take a clear-cut position on the Court\u2019s opposition to the Commission in Matos e Silva, although I find that the Court\u2019s position is, in the abstract, preferable. However, I can accept that it may occur that, in specific circumstances, proceedings are so severely hindered that their ongoing conduct is only theoretical and illusory. I would therefore accept that in rare cases the Commission\u2019s approach may be appropriate. But even adopting this flexible point of view, the conceptual incompatibility \u2013 mentioned by Golder \u2013 of finding simultaneous violations on both grounds \u2013 access and length \u2013 should, in my opinion, be respected. Failure to respect this would, as I will seek to show, bring about confusion and jeopardise the protection of human rights.<\/p>\n C. Anagnostopoulos follows the Commission, but does not contradict the Golder\/Matos e Silva common basis<\/strong><\/p>\n 17. The common basis establishing the above-mentioned conceptual incompatibility has indeed been respected in the development of the Court\u2019s case-law, even when the Commission\u2019s approach was revived a few years later in a judgment concerning Greece on which \u2013 in my opinion, incorrectly \u2013 the majority\u2019s view heavily relies: in Anagnostopoulos v. Greece (no. 54589\/00, 3 April 2003) a claim for civil damages in the context of criminal proceedings had not come to adjudication, since the belated summoning of the accused by an investigating judge had caused the offence to become time-barred. In this context, the Court held that the delay had deprived the applicant of the right of access to a court. It is important to note that the Court took due account of a country-specific feature (to which I shall refer several times \u2013 see, e.g., paragraphs 46, 52, 61, and 109 of the present opinion), namely that the Greek criminal courts were obliged to rule on compensation, within the limited amount provided by law, as claimed by the applicant, without being able, in case of conviction, to refer the civil action to the civil courts (see \u00a7\u00a7 19, 27 and 31-32 of Anagnostopoulos).<\/p>\n 18. The majority in Petrella rely on Anagnostopoulos in one of their arguments (see paragraph 51 of Petrella, which is under part B.2 concerning access to a court, after B.1 where a violation for the length of proceedings is found). Such argument appears to me to be developed as if Anagnostopoulos were a precedent for simultaneous violations on both grounds \u2013 access and length. But this is not the case, since Anagnostopoulos only reiterates the Commission\u2019s approach in Matos e Silva by finding a violation of access to a court resulting from a severe hindrance in fact, considered in the context of the country-specific obligation for criminal courts to adjudicate symbolic civil claims in case of conviction. There is no hint in Anagnostopoulos of possible simultaneous violations on the grounds of access and length. In this sense, Anagnostopoulos, despite having a different approach, does not contradict Golder, as explained above, or the common position in Matos e Silva: if there is no violation of the right of access, there may be a violation of the right to a reasonable length, while it is not possible that, if there is a violation of the right of access, there may also be a violation of the right to a reasonable length: plus includit minus.<\/p>\n 19. One should also recall that Judges Lorenzen and Vaji\u0107 appended a dissenting opinion to the Anagnostopoulos judgment. They stated their preference for the Court\u2019s (and not the Commission\u2019s) approach in Matos e Silva and \u2013 this is very relevant for my consideration of Petrella \u2013 invoked for the first time a possible intervention by the Grand Chamber, should Matos e Silva be disavowed (an invocation that, mutatis mutandis, applies also in Petrella \u2013 see my conclusion under VII below):<\/p>\n \u201cThe fact that the time-barring of the criminal proceedings resulted from a lengthy judicial investigation including a period of inaction of more than four years cannot lead to any other conclusion. … [T]he Court has constantly reaffirmed in its case-law that even very lengthy periods of inaction in judicial proceedings cannot be equated with a lack of effective access to a court. In Matos e Silva, Lda., and Others v. Portugal, 16 September 1996, the Court \u2013 going against the Opinion of the Commission \u2013 declared categorically: \u2018… The fact that the proceedings are taking a long time does not concern access to a tribunal. The difficulties encountered … relate to conduct of proceedings, not to access\u2019 (\u00a7 64). On the basis of this conclusion, other cases similar to the present case have been treated as relating to a problem of length of proceedings, and not to a question of access to a court (see the very recent judgment in Textile Traders Limited v. Portugal, 27 February 2003). This case-law can of course be modified but, in our opinion, such modification would be the responsibility of a Grand Chamber\u201d.[7]<\/p>\n 20. Moreover, the dissenting judges accepted \u2013 and again, this serves the purpose of the present opinion \u2013 a common ground with the majority in the view that breaches of the Convention protections of access to a court and of a reasonable length of proceedings are alternative findings.<\/p>\n D. Two erratic precedents opposing both Matos e Silva and Anagnostopoulos (and one additional precedent to go with them)<\/strong><\/p>\n 21. The Matos e Silva concepts have been consistently affirmed by the Court up to now; but occasionally, especially in some cases concerning Greece, the Anagnostopoulos approach has been adopted.<\/p>\n 22. Only in two cases concerning Bulgaria \u2013 closely linked to each other, as to both time of delivery and similarity of reasoning \u2013 can one trace simultaneous findings of violations of the right of access and of a reasonable length of proceedings. In my analysis which follows, these precedents have been attributed no precedential value as regards the aspect under scrutiny; they have substantially remained and should remain sub saliceand sub silentio, especially since the time when the Grand Chamber \u2013 as I will mention \u2013 dealt with the issue.<\/p>\n 23. Although there were clear indications, as I will show, that these precedents should have been considered per incuriam, unfortunately the majority in Petrella (paragraph 46) have rediscovered them. I therefore feel obliged to quickly comment on both, together with a third case indirectly related to them, in order to emphasise their erraticism.<\/p>\n 1. Atanasova<\/em><\/p>\n 24. In Atanasova v. Bulgaria (no. 72001\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 35-47, 2 October 2008), the Court draws a distinction with respect to Matos e Silva and another case in its wake. In finding a violation of the right of access, Atanasova follows Anagnostopoulos, by way of citing it and also citing Gousis v. Greece (no.\u00a08863\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 34-35, 29 March 2007), the latter being \u2013 in so far as relevant here \u2013 a replication of the former (both Greek cases, obviously, not involving simultaneous violations).<\/p>\n 25. Continuing the examination of the complaints, however, and without any mention of possible authorities, Atanasovaalso comes to find a violation of the right to the reasonable length of proceedings (\u00a7 57).<\/p>\n 26. Thus Atanasova, not sitting well with precedent, started a defective strand of case-law, albeit very limited in terms of the number of cases (two cases: the same Atanasova plus Tonchev, cited below), which, in my view, should be relegated among those without real precedential value. Petrellawillinstead revive thisstrand.<\/p>\n 2. Dinchev<\/em><\/p>\n 27. Dinchev v. Bulgaria (no. 23057\/03, 16 December 2008) was decided when Atanasova was not yet final; understandably, Dinchev does not mention Atanasova. However, some of the reasoning in Dinchev (\u00a7\u00a7 37-52) is closely dependent on the language of Atanasova (\u00a7\u00a7 35-47), of which it is often a literal translation. What is missing, compared to Atanasova, is a simultaneous finding of a violation for an excessive length of proceedings.<\/p>\n 28. Thus Dinchevis fully consistent with Anagnostopoulos and, like the latter, cannot be ascribed \u2013 notwithstanding the unfortunate finding to the contrary of the majority in Petrella (paragraph 51, where Dinchev is cited) \u2013 to the strand of case-law inaugurated by Atanasova (however, Dinchev is not cited in Petrella,\u00a7 46).<\/p>\n 29. I am referring to Dinchev in connection with Atanasova because it is, in my view, necessary to underline its ambivalent nature: it replicatesAtanasova in part, but without really following it.<\/p>\n 3. Tonchev<\/em><\/p>\n 30. After a few months, the judgment in Atanasova having become final in the meantime, in Tonchev v. Bulgaria (no. 18527\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 49 and 53, 19 November 2009) the Court for the second time found simultaneous violations.<\/p>\n 31. Tonchev (\u00a7 51) cites Anagnostopoulos, Atanasova and Dinchev in an undifferentiated manner to support the finding of a violation of a right of access to a court (only Atanasova being, however, an appropriate precedent, in my view, once a violation for a lack of reasonable length of proceedings had already been found (\u00a7 49)).<\/p>\n 32. In this respect, it is important to note the peculiar order of examination of complaints in Tonchev: first, length of proceedings; second, access to a court. This order seems to have inspired the majority in Petrella. An order inspired by logic (and by Golder: first, access to a court; then, and only if no violation of access exists, length of proceedings), in my opinion, would have been preferable.<\/p>\n 33. ThusTonchev is the second (and last, before Petrella) erratic occurrence in the Court\u2019s case-law in which the two violations are found.<\/p>\n E. The majority choose erraticism: a choice that cannot be shared<\/strong><\/p>\n 34. The majority in Petrella seem to feel safe building on Atanasova and Tonchev only (see paragraph 46 of Petrella) to assert \u2013 as if this was well-established case-law \u2013 that access to a court is a separate issue from the length of proceedings; thus, simultaneous findings of violations are, in their view, possible.<\/p>\n 35. As I have tried to show, the majority\u2019s construction in Petrella concerning the possibility of a double violation on the mere foundations of Atanasova and Tonchevis, in reality, built on quicksand. It is an approach based on erraticism that I cannot share.<\/p>\n 36. I could add more here, based on the Grand Chamber\u2019s judgment in Nicolae VirgiliuT\u0103nase v. Romania (no. 41720\/13 [GC], 25 June 2019): this judgment, in my view, disavows Atanasova and Tonchev. Since I will comment on this aspect when addressing the other passage of the Petrella reasoning with which I cannot agree (concerning the way in which the majority restates the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test, to be dealt with below in part III of this opinion), I take the liberty here of just referring to what follows.<\/p>\n III. THE \u201cTWO-AVENUE\u201d TEST<\/p>\n A. The \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test in its traditional formulation, specifically for access to a court (ex ante)<\/strong><\/p>\n 37. What I will describe here as the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test is an important tool in managing the concept of access to a court, as developed by the Court\u2019s case-law. The concept is common to other areas of the Court\u2019s case-law concerning fairness of proceedings, on which there is no need to dwell (but see, e.g., III.G. below).<\/p>\n 38. In my view this test, in its basic formulation, requires that, if there were two avenues of proceedings, both available and effective, when determining whether there is an Article 6 issue the Court must have regard to all the proceedings open to the applicant. Where the right of access is concerned, the test shows an obvious specific feature and, therefore, a different approach is needed as compared to the same test when addressing fairness issues: the Court does not need to assess whether the measures taken during the chosen proceedings weakened the applicant\u2019s position globally, also with reference to the separate proceedings which were not chosen (this being needed for fairness issues \u2013 an ex post assessment): it needs only to assess whether, at the moment in which one course of action was chosen, the other was accessible and effective (an ex ante assessment).<\/p>\n 39. In paragraph 49 of the judgment, the majority in the Chamber in Petrella refer to the traditional formula of the test, when addressing the issue of access to a court in the presence of a civil avenue, in addition to the lodging of a civil-party claim in criminal proceedings. In fact, they point out:<\/p>\n \u201c … that in cases where no consideration had been given to the merits of civil party claims …, [the Court] has attached importance to the accessibility and effectiveness of other judicial avenues open to the interested parties by which to submit their claims, in particular actions available before civil courts … [; and] in cases where it has considered that the applicants did have such remedies, it has then found that there was no violation of the right of access to a court …\u201d<\/p>\n B. The ex post exceptions to the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test introduced by the majority<\/strong><\/p>\n 40. However, in the subsequent paragraphs 50 and 51 of the judgment the majority have unexpectedly elaborated on the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test. I am unable to agree with this elaboration, since \u2013 as I will try to demonstrate \u2013 it introduces concepts that \u2013 in my view \u2013 are extraneous to the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test formulation as it emerges, in the area of access to a court, from the Court\u2019s established case-law, having been validated by the Grand Chamber. Moreover, in a similar vein to what I was obliged to note concerning the issue of simultaneous violations, the majority\u2019s approach is based on an analysis of case-law about which I regret to have to raise doubts.<\/p>\n 41. Turning now to the details of the majority\u2019s approach, they have construed the existing case-law as meaning that the \u201ctwo-avenue test\u201d would apply only (paragraph 50):<\/p>\n \u201cwhere criminal proceedings had not been conducted or had been discontinued on the basis that: no criminal offence had been found …, or that the criminal proceedings had been concluded under a plea-bargaining agreement … or under an exemption from ordinary jurisdiction … or because of the death of the accused … The same was true of cases where the applicant had already referred the matter to the civil court and obtained a review on the merits before the criminal proceedings were discontinued …\u201d<\/p>\n 42. According to the majority, the \u201ctwo-avenue test\u201d would not apply (paragraph 51)<\/p>\n \u201cwhere the discontinuance of criminal proceedings and the failure to consider the civil-party claim were due to circumstances mainly attributable to the judicial authorities, in particular excessive procedural delays causing the prosecution to become time-barred (see Anagnostopoulos v. Greece, no. 54589\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 31-32, 3 April 2003; Tonchev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 50-53; Gousis v. Greece, no. 8863\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 34-35, 29 March 2007; Atanasova, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 35-47; Dinchev v. Bulgaria, no. 23057\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 40-52, 22 January 2009; Boris Stojanovski v. \u201cFormer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d, no. 41916\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 56-57, 6 May 2010; Rokas v. Greece, no. 55081\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 22-24, 22 September 2015; and Korkolis v. Greece, no. 63300\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 21-25, 15 January 2015; see, a contrario[8],Lacerda Gouveia and Others, cited above, \u00a7 77; Dimitras v. Greece, no. 11946\/11, \u00a7 47, 19 April 2018; and Nicolae VirgiliuT\u0103nase, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 196-202 and 207-214, where the Court found that the authorities had no responsibility for the conduct of the criminal proceedings, thus concluding that Article 6 had not been violated in terms of the right of access to a court and the length of the proceedings).\u201d<\/p>\n 43. In short, the majority appear to show an intention to \u201cexport\u201d into the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test, as developed by the Court for the purpose of assessing the ex ante availability of an alternative avenue of access to a court, certain ex post evaluation criteria, which may be suited to the area of fairness of proceedings (where a global approach is necessary) but \u2013 in my view \u2013 are not applicable to access. As is evident from the above language, the majority also seem to derive their elaboration \u2013 which is indeed original and with some basis in the same erratic case-law I mentioned already under part II \u2013 from extensive case-law.<\/p>\n C. Is there really case-law supporting the majority\u2019s approach (other than Atanasova andthree other precedents \u201cdescending\u201d from it)?<\/strong><\/p>\n 44. Since I am, much to my regret, unable to agree with the reading of the Court\u2019s case-law on this aspect as provided by the majority, which I do respectfully find incorrect, I will have to engage in some analysis of the citations in paragraph 51 of Petrella (which has been reproduced in paragraph 42 of this opinion, in an English translation). Although the language of paragraph 51 of Petrella (just like the previous paragraph 50) is not really clear (for example reference is made, in general, to the finding of violations of Article 6 in the cases cited, but no specification is provided as to the type of violations), the position of paragraphs 50 and 51 after paragraph 49 (on which see paragraphs 71-87 of this opinion), as well as the consequences drawn in paragraphs 52 and following, make it evident that the majority believe that the case-law referred to in paragraph 51 supports the view that the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test, in its traditional ex ante formula, is not applicable \u201cwhen the discontinuance of criminal proceedings and the failure to consider the civil-party claim were due to circumstances mainly attributable to the judicial authorities, in particular excessive procedural delays causing the prosecution to become time-barred\u201d (an ex post assessment).<\/p>\n 45. In my reading, on the contrary, the alleged precedents listed in paragraph 51 of Petrella do not in general support this approach of the majority. Some of the cases listed are Anagnostopoulos-like cases, in which, as I mentioned above, the Court held \u2013 in some contrast to the line of case-law based on Matos e Silva \u2013 that due to the length of the proceedings the very essence of access to a court had been hindered (without ever, at the same time, with the sole exceptions of Atanasova and Tonchev, finding a simultaneous violation of the right to a reasonable length of proceedings). Never, in the cases cited in paragraph 51, is the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test discussed, nor is its applicability excluded because of assumed \u201ccircumstances mainly attributable to the judicial authorities, in particular excessive procedural delays causing the prosecution to become time-barred\u201d (paragraph 51 of the majority\u2019s reasoning). Having said this in general, a closer look at each citation is needed.<\/p>\n 1. Anagnostopoulos<\/em><\/p>\n 46. This precedent (on which I have already commented under II.C above) contains (in \u00a7 30) an indirect reference to the existence of a parallel avenue of redress before the civil court. However, the reason for the Court to focus only on the civil-party claim in the criminal proceedings in Anagnostopoulos is well explained in paragraphs 31-32 of that judgment, i.e., the fact that Greek law allowed a direct avenue before criminal court for small, symbolic civil claims (up to GRD 15,000, equivalent to EUR 44), criminal courts being obliged to determine them in case of conviction, not being allowed \u2013 as they would have otherwise been \u2013 to refer them to civil courts (see \u00a7\u00a7 17, 52, 61, and 109 of this opinion).<\/p>\n 47. In this specific case, therefore, the need to verify the existence of a parallel avenue before civil courts could be by-passed, since a civil party had a legitimate expectation that his or her claim would be determined, whether favourably or unfavourably, and it is all too obvious that consequently no discussion of the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test is provided in the judgment. The avenue chosen had to be construed as a civil avenue, albeit before a criminal court, while the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test only applies when civil-party claims are brought before criminal courts which have no obligation to determine them, being able to refer them to the civil courts (Anagnostopoulos, \u00a7 32):<\/p>\n \u201c… the applicant had lodged a claim for compensation in the amount of GRD 15,000, which constitutes a sum that the criminal courts examine in all cases without being obliged to refer the matter to the civil courts. The applicant therefore had a legitimate expectation that the courts would rule on this claim, whether favourably or unfavourably\u201d.<\/p>\n 2. Gousis,RokasandKorkolis<\/em><\/p>\n 48. Gousis, as mentioned before, relies on Anagnostopoulos, citing it in its paragraph 34, although there is no express mention that also in this case the criminal courts were bound to rule on a small civil claim. The same can be said for Rokas (\u00a7 23) and Korkolis (\u00a7 22).<\/p>\n 49. Be that as it may, the reasoning of these three Greek cases offers no support for the exceptional formulation of the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test as suggested in Petrella.<\/p>\n 3. Atanasova<\/em><\/p>\n 50. On the contrary, the majority\u2019s approach appears very close to paragraphs 44-46 of Atanasova, which can therefore be considered, in my view, a material precedent (although, as I said already and will better argue, a very weak one).<\/p>\n 51. In Atanasova (on which I already provided some comment under II.D) the Court considered that, although a civil avenue was available, nonetheless the fact of requiring the applicant to start a new civil case ten years after the event and eight years after the initiation of the criminal proceedings would have amounted to an excessive burden:<\/p>\n \u201c44. However, in a number of cases the Court has found a violation of Article 6 when the discontinuance of criminal proceedings and the failure to consider the civil-party claim were due to circumstances attributable to the judicial authorities, in particular excessive procedural delays causing the prosecution to become time-barred (see Anagnostopoulos v. Greece, no 54589\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 31-32, 3 April 2003, and Gousis v. Greece, no 8863\/03, \u00a7 \u00a7 34-35, March 29, 2007).<\/p>\n 45. In the Court\u2019s opinion, the present case must be distinguished from the cases of Matos e Silva, Lda., and Others and Buonfardieci (both cited above), in which the applicants\u2019 actions were still pending before a domestic court and the principle of their examination by the courts was not in issue. By contrast in the present case, the applicant\u2019s civil action could not be examined due to the termination of the criminal proceedings on the grounds that the prosecution had become time-barred. However, the applicant had made use of the possibility available to her under domestic law to be joined as a civil party to the criminal proceedings and to seek compensation for the damage caused by the accident of which she had been the victim. She therefore had a legitimate expectation that the courts would rule on this compensation claim, whether favourably or unfavourably. It was only the delay with which the prosecuting authorities dealt with the case that ultimately led to the prosecution becoming time-barred and, consequently, made it impossible for the applicant to have her compensation claim decided in the criminal proceedings.<\/p>\n 46. The Court therefore considers that the present case raises a separate issue with regard to the right of access to a court. In line with its conclusion in the Anagnostopoulos judgment, the Court finds that when the domestic legal system offers a remedy to litigants, such as the filing of a criminal complaint together with a civil-party claim, the State has the obligation to ensure that they enjoy the fundamental guarantees of Article 6. The applicant cannot be required, in circumstances such as those of the present case, to wait until the criminal liability of the perpetrator of the offence of which she was the victim becomes time-barred, through the fault of the judicial authorities, before introducing, eight years after joining the proceedings as a civil party and more than ten years after the event, a new action in the civil courts to seek compensation for the damage sustained (see Anagnostopoulos, cited above, \u00a7 32). The Court notes in particular that the bringing of such an action would entail the need to gather the evidence afresh, for which the applicant would henceforth be responsible, and that to establish the possible liability of the driver could prove to be extremely difficult such a long time after the event.\u201d<\/p>\n 52. We shall see that even this final part of paragraph 46 of Atanasova has (inappropriately in my view) inspired Petrella. Having thus recognised that Atanasova offers a basis for the majority\u2019s approach in Petrella, even though \u2013 without specific reasoning being offered \u2013 the same Atanasova exports Anagnostopoulos outside of its boundaries (marked, as I tried to show, by the peculiar Greek system obliging criminal courts to examine small civil claims, for which no referral to civil courts was possible \u2013 see \u00a7\u00a7\u00a017, 46, 52, 61 and 109 of this opinion), one should examine whether Atanasova has been successful in subsequent case-law. This analysis will be useful also for the purpose of exploring the success of Atanasova as to the finding of simultaneous violations (see paragraph 36 of this opinion).<\/p>\n 4. Tonchev, Dinchevand Boris Stojanovski<\/em><\/p>\n 53. Tonchev, also quoting Dinchev (the close relationship of both with Atanasova has already been a subject of my remarks \u2013 see II.D), shows that they are the second and third precedents that replicate the Atanasova approach to derogate from the traditional \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test. Thus for example, in Tonchev, we have the following language:<\/p>\n \u201c51. On this point the Court observes that in the recent cases of Atanasova and Dinchev it had to deal with situations which were essentially identical to those of the present case. In those two cases the applicants\u2019 civil-party claims brought in the context of criminal proceedings had not been examined due to the discontinuance of those criminal proceedings following the expiry of the relevant limitation periods. In both cases the Court found, by reference to Anagnostopoulos v. Greece (no. 54589\/00, 3 April 2003), that the applicants had not enjoyed effective access to a court and that this could not be cured by the possibility of bringing fresh claims in the civil courts (see Atanasova v. Bulgaria, no. 72001\/01, 2 October 2008, and Dinchev, cited above).\u201d<\/p>\n 54. Atanasova is thus cited and relied upon by these two judgments and also, later, by Boris Stojanovski (\u00a7 56).<\/p>\n D. T\u0103nase v. Atanasova:similar sounds, opposite meanings, just like \u201cdescending\u201d and \u201cdissenting\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n 55. Therefore, according to my review so far of the authorities on which paragraph 51 of the majority\u2019s reasoning builds its innovative conception of the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test, only Atanasovaand three precedents \u201cdescending\u201d from it are material; this is not the case, as I mentioned, for the Greek cases, which have their own different rationale, which does not conflict with the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test in its traditional form.<\/p>\n 56. But paragraph 51, in fine, of Petrella has more: acer in fundo.The paragraph offers three more references to case-law, peculiarly preceded by the locution a contrario. A contrarioreferences have been widely studied by scholars: especially when concerning case-law,theyrequire special caution, since judges must frame the reasoning of other judges regarding their unexpressed intentions, on the assumption that the explicit affirmation of a rule or a principle under certain circumstances (considering the text, the context, the object and the purpose of the previous judgment) excludes the application of that rule or principle in other circumstances.<\/p>\n 57. The a contrario references in paragraph 51 of Petrella concern three authorities, one of them very recent and of the Grand Chamber, Nicolae VirgiliuT\u0103nase v. Romania [GC], no. 41720\/13, 25 June 2019. Given the framework of Article 43 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, such citation a contrario is not without peculiarities. I will therefore, at this point of my opinion, have to discuss the text, the context, and some other aspects of this Grand Chamber judgment in so far as the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test is concerned: my consideration will be that this Grand Chamber precedent is not susceptible of an a contrario construction as stated in Petrella, since it clearly disavows, albeit implicitly, Atanasova and the three other \u201cdescending\u201d authorities mentioned above. I will also briefly mention the other two a contrario references. This will bring me to a conclusion very similar to the one I voiced in respect of the issue of simultaneous violations: also concerning the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test, Atanasova (and \u201cdescending\u201d case-law) cannot be considered as having precedential value today; T\u0103naseis \u201cdissenting\u201d, not \u201cdescending\u201d, fromAtanasova.<\/p>\n 58. In T\u0103nasethe Grand Chamber, in my view, clearly seeks to provide a restatement of its case-law as to the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test, among several other issues which are to be dealt with in this important judgment (the main aspect being whether Article 3 in its procedural limb is applicable to non-State ill-treatment, if inflicted unintentionally). Based also on extensive research, as the relevant materials reveal, the Grand Chamber was called upon to examine not only the implications of the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test in its pure form in the area of access to a court, but also the relevance of other possible tests regarding civil-party claims not examined on the merits.<\/p>\n 59. In particular, the Court had before it, very clearly, the Atanasova test. Since under Atanasova, in the event that the applicants\u2019 civil-party claims in the context of criminal proceedings had not been examined due to the discontinuance of those criminal proceedings following the expiry of the relevant limitation periods attributable to the authorities\u2019 conduct, the Court could find that the applicants had not enjoyed effective access to a court, even if the possibility of bringing claims in the civil courts was available at the time of the civil-party joinder to the criminal proceedings, and was still available at the moment of discontinuance, the Grand Chamber had to decide whether, if the traditional \u201ctwo-avenue test\u201d was applicable, the Atanasova assessment of diligence should be used first. The dilemma is clear. According to Atanasova, the test should concern:<\/p>\n (i) the diligence of the authorities in handling the criminal proceedings and their omissions\/negligence; then, only in the absence of such omissions\/negligence,<\/p>\n (ii) the availability of other avenues through which the victim could claim compensation.<\/p>\n Under the traditional \u201ctwo-avenue test\u201d, only assessment (ii) would be relevant.<\/p>\n 60. That being said as to the context, the text of the judgment reveals that the issue of the two avenues had clearly been raised by the parties: the applicant clearly refers in his position to Atanasova, submitting that, \u201c[s]incethe authorities had been responsible for the failure to examine his civil claim, this had amounted to a breach of his right of access to justice\u201d; the Government instead make clear reference to the pure \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test (see the parties\u2019 submissions in T\u0103nase\u00a7\u00a7 190-91).<\/p>\n 61. If the question was whether \u201cresponsibility\u201d for the failure to examine the claim was traceable to the authorities, I cannot but consider that Atanasova is implicitly, but clearly referred to. What is the Grand Chamber\u2019s reply?<\/p>\n 62. The Grand Chamber, for its part (\u00a7 196), has before it the fact that:<\/p>\n \u201cthe … authorities discontinued the criminal proceedings against both J.C.P. and D.I. on the grounds, respectively, that not all the elements of an offence had been met and that the limitation period for criminal liability had taken effect. As a result, the civil claim joined to the criminal proceedings was not examined by any criminal court.\u201d<\/p>\n But, not surprisingly in my view, the Grand Chamber \u2013 as a premise to adopting the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test in its traditional format \u2013 does not consider at all whether there were \u201cresponsibilities\u201d on the part of the authorities (especially as to the length of the proceedings leading to the time-barring which had caused the criminal proceedings against D.I. to be discontinued); rather, it limits itself to reviewing the lawfulness and non-arbitrariness of discontinuance under domestic law, especially concerning a possible \u201cobligation\u201d to examine the civil claim even after discontinuance (and here one can see a clear reference, mutatis mutandis, to the Anagnostopoulos scheme):<\/p>\n \u201c197. None of the parties have argued or submitted evidence suggesting that when the proceedings against J.C.P. and D.I. ended, the criminal courts were under an obligation to examine the applicant\u2019s civil claim despite their decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings. Moreover, given the available evidence, the Court considers that it was not arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable for the domestic authorities to decide to discontinue the criminal proceedings instituted against J.C.P. and D.I., for the reasons mentioned above (see paragraph 196).\u201d<\/p>\n At this point of the reasoning, the Grand Chamber restates and endorses the classical \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test. This is for me an element of the utmost importance in assessing the relationship (of incompatibility) between T\u0103naseand Atanasova. Citations in this passage (and omitted citations sub silentio) are also crucial:<\/p>\n \u201c198. In this context, it may be noted that in cases where civil\u2011party claims made in the context of criminal proceedings have not been examined by reason of the termination of those proceedings, the Court has had regard to the availability of other channels through which the applicants could vindicate their civil rights. In cases where the applicants had at their disposal accessible and effective avenues for their civil claims, it found that their right of access to a court had not been infringed (see Assenov and Others, cited above, \u00a7 112; Ernst and Others v. Belgium, no. 33400\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 54\u201155, 15 July 2003; Moldovan and Others v. Romania(no. 2), nos. 41138\/98 and 64320\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 119-22, ECHR 2005\u2011VII (extracts); Forum Maritime S.A. v. Romania, nos. 63610\/00 and 38692\/05, \u00a7 91, 4 October 2007; Borobar and Others v. Romania, no. 5663\/04, \u00a7 56, 29 January 2013; and Association of the Victims of S.C. Rompetrol S.A. and S.C. Geomin S.A. [System] and Others v. Romania, no. 24133\/03, \u00a7 65, 25 June 2013).\u201d<\/p>\n 63. An immediate remark can address the fact that \u2013 had the Grand Chamber wanted to endorse the Atanasova concepts \u2013 step (i) of the relevant test referred to in paragraph 59 above would be developed at this point of the reasoning (i.e., assessing the diligence of the authorities in handling the criminal proceedings and their omissions\/negligence). But \u2013 not surprisingly, in my view \u2013 the Grand Chamber develops a different analysis, clearly inspired by the classical \u201ctwo-avenue test\u201d, going straight to step (ii).<\/p>\n 64. The majority in Petrella (paragraph 51), probably in order to address this aspect, and also to justify their reference to T\u0103naseas consistent with Atanasova (albeit T\u0103nase does not cite Atanasova! \u2013 on this, see below) in an a contrario relationship between the two, juxtapose the citation of paragraphs 196-202 of T\u0103nase with that of its paragraphs 207-14 and submit that the Grand Chamber<\/p>\n \u201cfound that the authorities had no responsibility for the conduct of the criminal proceedings, thus concluding that Article 6 had not been violated in terms of the right of access to a court and the length of the proceedings\u201d.<\/p>\n In other words, if I understand it correctly, the argument of the majority in Petrella to read T\u0103naseas an a contrario confirmation ofAtanasovais as follows: since no responsibility was to be found on the part of the authorities (I presume, in the area of the reasonable time requirement, to which the citation of \u00a7\u00a7 207-14 refers), there was no need for the Grand Chamber to explicitly deal with step (i) referred to above in paragraph 59 of this opinion.<\/p>\n 65. This is, in my view, with all due respect to the majority, an incorrect use of the a contrario argument: I mentioned before the need for caution in the a contrario exercise of considering text, context, and all other circumstances in order to draw from a proposition that was accepted the intention to reject a contrary proposition; fallacies are always lurking in such instances. In my view the point is as follows: is it reasonable to say that, although no violations were found in the conduct of proceedings in the specific case, the Grand Chamber would have applied step (i) of the test, had violations been found (concerning the length of proceedings)? This is the question to be asked, in my view, since the a contrario argument must essentially be based on common sense; otherwise, by supporting the idea that T\u0103nase \u201cdescends\u201d from Atanasova, one runs the risks incurred by the a contrario etymologists in favour of lucus a non lucendo. Common sense, in my view, rather supports the consideration that T\u0103nase \u201cdissents\u201d fromAtanasova. Similar sounds, opposite meanings. This can be said even of the titles of these cases in relation to their content.<\/p>\n 66. An aspect which is, in my view, very relevant is the order in which the questions were examined in T\u0103nase. While \u2013 as I mentioned \u2013 Tonchev(improving the Atanasova reasoning, which follows the opposite order) logically has the duration of proceedings (with respect to which the omissions\/negligence of the authorities are found) examined before coming to rule on the aspect of access to a court, the Grand Chamber in T\u0103nasedisposes of the issue of access before dealing with a possible violation concerning the length of proceedings. This is a strong indication that, contrary to what the majority in Petrella suggest, the logic followed was that of the classical \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test. Of course, I accept that the order of examination of questions is not decisive: language can be inverted, without logic being subverted. But in that case an elementary principle of clarity would have required the Grand Chamber, according to a well-established practice, at least to include some language \u2013 when dealing with the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d issue \u2013 to the effect that the relevant finding was linked to (and dependent on) the subsequent finding of a lack of responsibility on the part of the authorities. I can even concede that such language could be substituted by some implicit way of referring to the underlying argument: but then, would we not need to find at least a cross-reference? I could not find any textual element supporting the Petrella reading of the judgment by the Grand Chamber. Under these circumstances, the minimum text analysis requirements to build an a contrario argument do not appear to be met: in T\u0103nase the assessment of length is made subsequently, and therefore also independently, with respect to the assessment relating to a violation of the right of access to a court.<\/p>\n 67. Another aspect of text analysis concerns citations. The Court\u2019s activity is based on precedents; relevant resources are invested to make the Court\u2019s case-law accessible and clear; case-law analysis is provided to the public by the same Court.<\/p>\n 68. Against this background, although Atanasova-based arguments were certainly present in the materials before the Grand Chamber and \u2013 as I showed (see paragraph 60 of this opinion) \u2013 they appear in the parties\u2019 submissions as referred to in T\u0103nase, what can reasonably be the meaning of the fact that Atanasova was never cited by the Grand Chamber? Is it reasonable to believe that a citation was omitted without this implying some disapproval? A mere effect of inadvertence? By a Grand Chamber? I would rather consider that a reasonable reader would draw the conclusion that T\u0103nase disavowed Atanasova, by relegating that line of case-law sub silentio.<\/p>\n 69. Incidentally, it may be worth mentioning that Tonchev was cited by T\u0103nase (\u00a7 128) but … on an aspect that has nothing to do with the topic I am discussing here. Again incidentally, Anagnostopoulos was never explicitly cited by T\u0103nase, although I have shown that it was taken into account (see paragraph 62 of this opinion).<\/p>\n E. T\u0103nase is solidly grounded in its own precedents: a comparison of citations<\/strong><\/p>\n 70. The deliberate omission of citations \u2013 aimed at overruling previous case-law deemed per incuriam \u2013 especially in a Grand Chamber judgment is \u2013 as I have tried to explain so far \u2013 an eloquent element (silens loquitur) for the interpretation of case-law. But even more eloquent are citations that are positively included in the judgment, as they belong both to the text and to the context. The allegedly a contrario standing of T\u0103nase with respect to Atanasova should be tested against the results of such additional analysis; it is therefore necessary for me to devote some reflections to the precedents on which T\u0103nase is grounded, since the discussion will also allow me to note, with regret, that the majority in Petrella neglected a similar exercise (or, at least, no signs are visible, although some citations are common) and thus missed the opportunity to frame T\u0103nasecorrectly as supporting the traditional \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test.<\/p>\n 71. I will limit my task to an analysis of the authorities cited both by T\u0103nase(in \u00a7 198, which must have been closely considered by the majority, since this paragraph belongs to those cited in paragraph 51 of Petrella) and by Petrella at the same time (although somewhat tending towards different purposes). Of course, it should be clear that Petrella contains some additional citations on which, given their lesser importance with respect to T\u0103nase, I will not dwell.<\/p>\n 72. One remark is obvious and repetitive, based on what has already been noted: the classical \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test is based by T\u0103nase on precedents which \u2013 with one irrelevant exception \u2013 do not include Atanasova-like cases, nor Anagnostopoulos-like cases. The question is why these two kinds of precedents are, on the contrary, listed in Petrella (paragraph 51), without any explanation being given for their omission from T\u0103nase, other than restating the Atanasova test and mentioning T\u0103nase as a precedent a contrario, rather than an authority contradicting the majority\u2019s point.<\/p>\n 1. No responsibility of the authorities<\/em><\/p>\n 73. The above analysis can start with a group of cases, cited in T\u0103nase, which the majority in Petrella seek to present as cases in which no responsibilities were attributable to the authorities (the citation appears in paragraph 50 of Petrella, where T\u0103naseis not mentioned). One should have a closer look.<\/p>\n (a) Assenov and Others, Moldovan and Others (no. 2) and Forum Maritime S.A.<\/p>\n 74. A subgroup within the above precedents (Assenov and Others, Moldovan and Others (no. 2), and Forum Maritime S.A.), according to the majority in Petrella (paragraph 50 of the judgment), supposedly includes cases in which a lack of responsibility on the part of the authorities was due to the non-existence of an offence.<\/p>\n 75. This remark by the majority raises serious doubts as to its pertinence. What is the relationship between the category of lack of responsibility of the authorities and the same authorities\u2019 finding that there was no offence? How would this be relevant if a reasonable time issue is at stake or, still less, if the Court finds that there was no effective investigation into the offence? While these questions remain unanswered, a mere reading of these precedents shows rather that responsibilities existed (and violations were found) and that nonetheless the classical \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test is deemed applicable. Thus, these precedents appear to me to be rightly cited in T\u0103nase to support, as I have tried to demonstrate, a position that is opposite to that of Petrella.<\/p>\n 76. In particular, in Assenov several violations were found, thus showing negligence\/omissions on the part of the authorities (among others, violations of Article 3 for failure to carry out an effective official investigation into allegations of ill-treatment, and of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention in that the applicant was not tried within a reasonable time or released pending trial). The Court also finds (Assenov,\u00a7 112) that \u201csince [the applicant] did not attempt to bring civil proceedings … it cannot be said that he was denied access to a court …\u201d. While is understandable that T\u0103nase relies on this precedent, I frankly cannot understand how it can be used to support the majority\u2019s approach in Petrella (in addition, the passages of Assenov cited in Petrella are not the crucial ones I have recalled above, but they refer \u2013 as I mentioned \u2013 to domestic findings as to the non-existence of an offence).<\/p>\n 77. Likewise, in Moldovan (no. 2)violations are found of Articles 8, 3, and 14, as well as of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the length of the proceedings, whereas no violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 is found by reason of a denial of access to a court. Again, negligence or omissions could be attributed to the authorities and the Court concludes (Moldovan (no. 2), \u00a7\u00a0121)that, since the applicants had brought successful actions against some persons, they \u201cc[ould] not claim an additional right to a separate civil action\u201d against others. While this is a rather case-specific application of the \u201ctwo-avenue test\u201d, in general the formulation of the test fully supports T\u0103nase and certainly not the majority\u2019s approach in Petrella (which again refers to the lack of an offence and cites passages that seem irrelevant to me).<\/p>\n 78. In Forum Maritime S.A. (\u00a7\u00a7 91-94),again, the claim concerning a lack of access to a court is rejected as manifestly ill-founded on the basis of the traditional two-avenue test, while violations are found of Article 6 \u00a7 1 both on account of the breach of the right to an independent and impartial tribunal in the criminal proceedings in which a civil-party claim had been made, and on account of the restrictions on the right of access to the prosecution file. Additionally, there is a finding of a violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a01 on account of the length of the commercial proceedings. Again, the majority in Petrella rely on an immaterial citation of this judgment, which fully supports T\u0103nase.<\/p>\n (b) Ernst and Others<\/p>\n 79. Ernst and Others is, according to the majority in Petrella (see paragraph 50 of the judgment), in a subgroup of its own: here the majority see a justification for the application of a classical \u201ctwo-avenue test\u201d in the fact that the authorities bore no responsibility for the termination, due to an exemption from ordinary jurisdiction. On my reading, this judgment shows on the contrary that \u2013 in a very peculiar context \u2013 the exemption from jurisdiction enjoyed by only one of the applicant\u2019s opponents was but one aspect of the facts, while there were findings of violations of Articles 8 and 10 (and not of Article 6 on grounds of access to a court). The relevant passage of the judgment (Ernst,\u00a7\u00a7 54-55) shows, in my view, that a quite traditional \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test (as would later appear in T\u0103nase) was held to be applicable (with some adaptation to the peculiarity of the case, and \u2013 what matters even more \u2013 without any lack of responsibility of the authorities being considered):<\/p>\n \u201c… the Court attaches importance to the fact that, in Belgian law, the lodging of a civil-party claim before the investigating judge is but one of the methods of bringing a civil action and that the victims in principle have other avenues by which to assert their civil rights … [so that,] … in so far as their complaint was directed against persons other than judges or prosecutors, they could have brought a civil action against these persons before the civil court … [and even against a judge or prosecutor] … in exceptional cases. … Whilst the applicants did not attempt a civil action against individuals, they did, on the other hand, at the same time as being joined as civil parties to the criminal proceedings, bring … an action for damages against the Belgian State before the civil court on the basis of the same facts … [T]he facts show that the inadmissibility of the applicants\u2019 civil-party claim and the dropping of their criminal complaint … did not result in depriving them of any action for compensation.\u201d<\/p>\n 2. Parallel civil claim<\/em><\/p>\n 80. The majority in Petrella have also considered that the application of the classical \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test was justified, and that no violation of the right of access to a court could be found, where \u201cthe applicant had already lodged a parallel claim before the civil court and had obtained a determination on the merits before the criminal proceedings were discontinued\u201d (paragraph 50 of Petrella, in fine). The authorities cited include one precedent on which I will not dwell (since T\u0103nasedoes not rely on it), and another precedent which is instead cited in T\u0103nase. Surprisingly, however, the second precedent is cited in Petrella with the signal mutatis mutandis. I am referring to Borobar and Others.<\/p>\n 81. Borobar is very interesting, although it is unclear to me why it should be associated, even mutatis mutandis, with the different case where \u201cthe applicant had already lodged a parallel claim before the civil court and had obtained a determination on the merits before the criminal proceedings were discontinued\u201d.<\/p>\n 82. Borobar has much more: it is therefore unfortunate, in my view, that the majority in Petrella missed the opportunity to discuss this case in detail, even if only to distinguish it; instead, they decided to relegate it behind a mutatis mutandis.<\/p>\n 83. The Court dealt there with the case of three applicants, one of whom had availed herself of a remedy before the civil court before joining criminal proceedings as a civil party; the other two applicants had only been joined as civil parties in the criminal proceedings, with no previous civil actions. The Court therefore continued with the analysis of the complaint concerning the right of access to a court only in respect of the first applicant (Borobar,\u00a7\u00a7 59-62), since:<\/p>\n \u201chaving regard to the subsidiary character of the Convention mechanism, the Court consider[ed] that the second and third applicants should have brought a separate new action before the civil courts and that it [was] not for the Court to speculate on the outcome of such an action. …\u201d<\/p>\n 84. Thus in Borobar the Court (in my view coherently with what was later to be stated in T\u0103nase) affirmed the existence of an obligation to use the civil avenue after discontinuance of the criminal proceedings, before an applicant could bring a complaint under the Convention concerning the right of access to a court.<\/p>\n 85. The language used clarifies that this obligation, to be complied with if a lack of access to court is to be verified, exists independently of the fact that a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 may be found because of an excessive duration of criminal proceedings leading to discontinuance (eight years).<\/p>\n 86. It can easily be considered that, from the viewpoint relevant to Petrella, the position of the first applicant (on which the majority seem to focus) is not really material; it is also important to note that her previous claim before the civil court (which had been brought one year before the civil-party claim in the criminal court, and had been finally dismissed four years later, while the criminal proceedings were still pending \u2013 Borobar,\u00a7\u00a059) was held by the Court to be an \u201ceffective remedy in respect of the applicant\u2019s civil claims\u201d (Borobar, \u00a7 72), such that no violation of the right of access to a court was found.<\/p>\n 87. Consequently, in my view, reflecting on Borobar helps to understand why T\u0103nasewould clearly refer to remedies existing at the time when the civil-party claim is lodged in criminal proceedings (ex ante), without finding relevant the situation at the time when the criminal proceedings are discontinued (ex post) to assess the availability and effectiveness of access to a court in two-avenue situations. I have already mentioned this aspect and I will return to it later (see, for example, paragraphs 38, 91 and 97 et seq. of this opinion).<\/p>\n 3. A precedent sub silentio: Association of the Victims<\/em><\/p>\n 88. I have already mentioned that I will not analyse the precedents that are referred to in Petrella, as they are not relevant for the exercise I propose. There is, on the contrary, one authority on which T\u0103naserelies, which the majority in Petrella pass over in silence. I am referring to the case of Association of the Victims of the S.C. Rompetrol S.A. and S.C. Geomin S.A.\u00a0System and Others v. Romania.<\/p>\n 89. In Association of the Victims the Court found a violation for the excessive length of the criminal proceedings which the applicant association had joined as a civil-party (\u00a7\u00a7 74-80). Therefore, there was for sure some responsibility of the authorities, in a way very similar to Petrella. None of the criteria that the majority in Petrella seek to develop were applicable to excuse the Court from a parallel finding of a violation of the right of access to a court. Yet, the claim relating to access to a court was dealt with before and independently from that concerning the duration of proceedings; and no violation was found.<\/p>\n 90. Again similarly to what would be material in Petrella, it was the prosecutor\u2019s inaction which led to the time-barring of the proceedings (seeAssociation of the Victims, \u00a7 64, where the Court also noted that in Romanian law, when the court is seised of a civil-party claim, it can decide to examine the civil action irrespective of the discontinuance of the criminal charge, citing a contrarioAtanasova and Anagnostopoulos\u2013 see, e.g., paragraphs 17, 46, 52, 61 and 109 of the present opinion).<\/p>\n 91. In this context, the Association of the Victims judgment (\u00a7\u00a7 65-67) is very clear in providing a further basis on which to consider that the availability of two avenues is something to be evaluated at the time when the claim is brought (ex ante), so that the relevant assessment is in principle independent of the authorities\u2019 subsequent behaviour, which may only become relevant for other aspects related to the conduct of proceedings:<\/p>\n \u201c65. The Court also notes that in other cases where the failure to examine a civil-party claim on account of the inadmissibility or the termination of the criminal proceedings in the context of which it had been brought was at issue, it took into account the existence of other avenues open to the applicants by which to assert their claims. In the cases where the applicants had accessible and effective remedies, it concluded that there had been no violation of the right of access to a court (see Ernst and Others v. Belgium, no 33400\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 53-55, 15 July 2003, and Forum Maritime SA v. Romania, nos. 63610\/00 and 38692\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 91-93, 4 October 2007).<\/p>\n 66. In the present case, the relevant domestic law allowed the applicant to bring a claim for compensation in the civil courts since the very occurrence of the facts, criminal conviction not being a condition sine qua non for a civil claim for compensation. Indeed, he had the choice between bringing a civil action before civil courts and being joined as a civil party within the framework of his criminal complaint. However, the applicant did not take any action before the civil courts. He chose of his own free will, when the separate civil action was already time-barred (see paragraph 41 above), to become a civil party in the context of his criminal complaint, an avenue which is probably simpler and less expensive, but thus incurring the risk that the authorities seised might not be able to examine his civil action.<\/p>\n 67. In the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that the failure to examine the applicant\u2019s civil action in the context of his criminal complaint did not affect the very substance of his right of access to a court. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected under Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.\u201d<\/p>\n 92. Thus, Association of the Victims \u2013 relied upon by T\u0103nase \u2013 shows, coherently with all the other results of the above analysis of citations, the rationale of the Grand Chamber\u2019s determination as to the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test \u2013 a rationale which has not been perceived by the majority in Petrella. As for their omitting to refer to Association of the Victims, notwithstanding the fact that a relevant Grand Chamber judgment had relied on it as to the very topic at issue, I cannot speculate on finding in this a possible practical application of Wittgenstein\u2019s seventh proposition. What is for sure is that the Association of the Victims judgment would have offered food for thought in dealing with Petrella differently, just as it had inspired T\u0103nase.<\/p>\n 93. To conclude my exercise in comparative analysis of citations, I consider that the fact that T\u0103nase cites Association of the Victims, Borobar and a series of other relevant authorities which were perceived differently by the Petrella majority (whereas Association of the Victims was not even cited) is an important element of the text and the context of the Grand Chamber\u2019s judgment that should have led the same majority to adjudicate otherwise. Surprisingly, also, the precedents in which T\u0103naseis \u2013 in my view \u2013 solidly groundedare cited by the majority in Petrella in paragraphs (49 and 50) that are set apart from the paragraph (51) dedicated to reviving the Atanasovaapproach (and in 51, as I have said already, T\u0103nase is cited a contrario). In my view, the manner in which the majority choose to refer to T\u0103nasea contrario, rather than to recognise it as an authority disavowing Atanasova, creates even more confusion when one considers that the majority in Petrella (still in paragraph 51) combine within the a contrario reference two additional citations of cases \u2013 Lacerda Gouveia and Dimitras \u2013 in which the Court, in very specific contexts, had not found violations of the right of access to a court and had not explicitly examined the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test. I regret to have to note that this way of citing the Court\u2019s precedents, in addition to depriving of importance the precedents upon which a Grand Chamber judgment was based, has in turn deprived the majority in Petrella of the opportunity to comment on whether the authorities validated by the Grand Chamber were consistent with the approach chosen in favour of the Atanasova concepts. In my humble view, theywere not.<\/p>\n F. Restatement in T\u0103nase of the traditional ex ante \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test<\/strong><\/p>\n 94. It then seems correct to me to say thatT\u0103nasedisavowed Atanasovaand the non-numerous precedents descending from the latter by relegating them sub silentio. I have tried to provide textual and contextual clues to that effect, as well as some additional consideration of circumstances. The main points have been, however, (i) clear textual incompatibility of the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test as adopted in T\u0103nase with the Atanasova-like arguments present in the case (in particular, the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test having been applied in its traditional formula, and the order of examination of the issues contrary to the Tonchev-Petrella order); (ii) lack of Atanasova-like citations; (iii)\u00a0presence of citations of authorities contrary to Atanasova; (iv) contexts of the latter authorities clearly inspired by the classical \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test. Finding \u2013 with all due respect \u2013 flaws in the different reading of precedents by the majority in Petrella has reinforced my considerations.<\/p>\n 95. It remains for me to emphasise an additional clue supporting the above idea, parallel to the textual incompatibility of principles. I am referring to the conceptual incompatibility with Atanasova of the classic \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test as restated by the Grand Chamber in T\u0103nase. The concept I wish to underline is that the Grand Chamber in T\u0103nase (\u00a7 199) explicitly refers to the need to consider the existence of an alternate civil avenue not at the time of the discontinuance of the criminal avenue, but at the time (often a much earlier moment, if lengthy proceedings are involved) when the applicant decides to use the penal route:<\/p>\n \u201c197. None of the parties have argued or submitted evidence suggesting that when the proceedings against J.C.P. and D.I. ended, the criminal courts were under an obligation to examine the applicant\u2019s civil claim despite their decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings. Moreover, given the available evidence, the Court considers that it was not arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable for the domestic authorities to decide to discontinue the criminal proceedings instituted against J.C.P. and D.I., for the reasons mentioned above …<\/p>\n 199. In the present case, at the time when the applicant joined the criminal proceedings as a civil party, he could have brought separate civil proceedings against J.C.P. and D.I. instead. While the available evidence and the Government\u2019s explanations indicate that such proceedings might have been stayed pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings, the Court notes that no evidence was provided by the parties to suggest that the applicant could not have obtained a determination of the merits of his civil claims on the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.\u201d<\/p>\n 96. Therefore, the classical ex ante \u201ctwo-avenue test\u201d is restated by the Grand Chamber (\u00a7 197), including: (i) the review as to whether there was an obligation of the criminal courts to dispose of the civil claim or whether a referral to the civil courts would have been possible (the Anagnostopoulos exception \u2013 see, e.g., \u00a7\u00a7 17, 46, 52, 61 and 109 of the present opinion \u2013 is here evident, as is the reliance on \u00a7 64 of Association of Victims, forgotten in Petrella); (ii) the review of mere lawfulness and non-arbitrariness of the criminal discontinuance (without any interference at all with the issue of length, which entails an ex post assessment and is examined separately).<\/p>\n 97. I consider that the T\u0103nase restatement of the classical rule, through the reference to the availability (and effectivity) of an alternate avenue at the starting point of the claim (ex ante), and not at the end of its treatment by the criminal authorities (ex post), shows a clear conceptual incompatibility with an Atanasova approach. The irrelevance of the length of the proceedings \u2013 which is a separate issue, as I mentioned, since Matos e Silva was decided \u2013 is confirmed by the fact that under the T\u0103nase restatement (\u00a7\u00a0199) even a possible stay of the civil proceedings, while the criminal proceedings are pending, is not a problem impacting on access, but maybe on length.<\/p>\n 98. To complete the picture resulting from T\u0103nase, it should be added that the Grand Chamber \u2013while adopting an ex ante approach to evaluate the availability of the civil avenue \u2013 clarifies the existence of a supplementary step of the test, evidently to be applied if the ex ante approach reveals that no alternative civil avenue existed at the starting point of the civil-party claim.<\/p>\n This step is mentioned inT\u0103nase as an obiter, ad abundantiam criterion, since in the case at issue the ex ante standard was sufficient:<\/p>\n \u201c200. Moreover, the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings against J.C.P. and D.I. did not bar the applicant from lodging a separate civil action against them with a civil court once he became aware of the final judgments of the criminal courts upholding the public prosecutor\u2019s offices\u2019 decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings. Furthermore, as explained by the Government (see paragraphs 95-96 above), it would have been possible for the applicant to argue that the limitation period for bringing a separate civil claim did not run during the pendency of the criminal proceedings with civil claims. Therefore, such an action was not necessarily destined to fail.\u201d<\/p>\n 99. Thus, if no alternative civil avenue exists ex ante, nevertheless access to a court is not prevented if, even though the civil proceedings might have been stayed during the criminal proceedings, the Court is not satisfied that bringing a civil action after the stay would have led \u201cnecessarily\u201d to a failure in the final determination by the civil courts. Here one finds a further argument, in my view, to state a total conceptual incompatibility with the Atanasova-Petrella approach. Issues of negligence\/omissions are to be dealt with \u2013 in the classical Matos e Silva scheme \u2013 as procedural flaws and\/or an unreasonable length of proceedings under Article 6; only in this area does an ex post approach regain its significance.<\/p>\n G. Follow-up toT\u0103nase<\/strong><\/p>\n 100. It may be not without meaning \u2013 and in my opinion it is very meaningful \u2013 that the way in which T\u0103nasehas been followed up by the Court has confirmed the approach of the Grand Chamber as to the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test.<\/p>\n 101. The relevant follow-up can be traced to the very day of the delivery of the Grand Chamber judgment, when Judge K\u016bris appended to it a partly dissenting opinion. I do not need to dwell on this opinion, except for remarking that in it my distinguished colleague sharply criticises the findings of no violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1, both as to the right of access to a court and the right to a reasonable length of proceedings, and clearly summarises (see paragraph 84 of his opinion) the (main) rationale on which the majority in the Grand Chamber had considered that access to court had been available:<\/p>\n \u201cat the time when the applicant joined the criminal proceedings as a civil party, he could instead have brought separate civil proceedings against the two private individuals (whom he challenged in the criminal proceedings …)\u201d<\/p>\n 102. This is, in my view, one additional confirmation of what the Grand Chamber stated in T\u0103nase when dealing with the \u201ctwo-avenue test\u201d: something very clear (such that one of the judges felt the need to manifest his dissent) and very far from what the majority in Petrella have perceived.<\/p>\n 103. In order to further reflect on the distance that the majority in the Chamber in Petrella have created from the case-law validated by the Grand Chamber, it may also be worth noting that some indirect additional confirmation of the T\u0103nase principles related to the \u201ctwo-avenue test\u201d recently came from two judgments which were not yet final at the time of the deliberations in Petrella. The judgments are MihailMih\u0103ilescu v.\u00a0Romania, no. 3795\/15,and Victor Lauren\u021biu Marin v. Romania, no.\u00a075614\/14, both of 12 January 2021.<\/p>\n 104. The contexts of these cases are very different from those in Petrella and T\u0103nase, as the cases of 12 January 2021 both concern fairness of proceedings (where \u2013 as I mentioned \u2013 space for ex post assessments is open). Also, there is no explicit consideration of the right of access to a court, although some language comes very close to this concept. In one case only is there a complaint concerning the length of proceedings, but it is examined under the head of Article 2 positive obligations. In one case only had the applicant filed a civil action. The discontinuance of criminal proceedings had been based by the authorities on different factors, but the statute of limitations was relevant (see Mih\u0103ilescu,\u00a7 86).<\/p>\n 105. That having been said, I will confine myself to quoting some language from Mih\u0103ilescu (where \u2013 as I mentioned \u2013 there was also a discontinuance because of statutory limitations), underlining however that paragraphs 80-84 of Mih\u0103ilescu are parallel to paragraphs 137-41 of Marin. One may notice that T\u0103nase is cited and that a \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test is applied, with a somehow different approach suited to the fairness issues (rather than access to a court). What appears important to me is that the Court reiterates that, when determining whether there was an Article 6 issue (here, in general, of fairness),\u201cthe Court will have regard to all the proceedings open to the applicant\u201d, and \u201cwill assess whether the measures taken during the [criminal proceedings] weakened the applicant\u2019s position concerning his civil claim to such an extent that all subsequent stages of these proceedings or separate civil proceedings would have been rendered unfair from the outset\u201d. Notwithstanding the differences, the T\u0103naseprinciples are reiterated.<\/p>\n IV. THE DIFFERENT FINDING THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE<\/p>\n 106. Turning now to the correct finding that, in my opinion, the Court should have made in determining the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning access to a court in the present case, my considerations in part II of this opinion, addressing the relationship between the protection of the right of access to court and the protection of the right to a reasonable length of proceedings, lead me to say that the majority should have chosen between the Matos e Silva approach and the Anagnostopoulos approach, should the latter still be feasible after T\u0103nase.<\/p>\n 107. In the present case, it is undisputed that there was no real civil claim, the filing of which in the domestic system was allowed at the later stage of the preliminary hearing, to be held only if the prosecution decided to press charges (see paragraph 11 of the judgment); however, according to some country-specific case-law of the Court, since in the domestic law some procedural rights are granted to the party filing a criminal complaint even before the joinder of a civil claim in the criminal proceedings, some space for applicability of Article 6 \u00a7 1 as to the right to a reasonable length of proceedings has been recognised (see Arnoldi v. Italy, no. 35637\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 25-44, 7 December 2017 and additional case-law cited in paragraph 22 of the judgment). I will later explain that I have some hesitations as to the Arnoldi case-law, although I voted with the majority in finding a violation of the right to a reasonable length of proceedings.<\/p>\n 108. What matters at this point is that, for the first time in Petrella, the majority have extended the Arnoldi concept, granting protection against an excessive length of proceedings to complainants who have only filed complaints with the police or the prosecutor, to the right of access to a court. I am unable to agree on that point. Even conceding at this stage that one can equate the position of the person filing a criminal complaint with that of a civil party in criminal proceedings (but I will explain my general hesitations about this), in the area of access to a court this would not be material, since the majority should have used the specific test, validated by the Grand Chamber in T\u0103nase, imposing on them a need to determine whether the criminal courts (in our case, not seised in reality, since the complaint still lay with the prosecutor\u2019s office, albeit that a judge ultimately agreed on the discontinuance \u2013 see paragraph 9 of the judgment) were under an obligation to examine the applicant\u2019s civil claim without being able to refer the case to a civil court.<\/p>\n 109. The test would have given the result that no evidence has been provided that, in the domestic system, criminal courts were under such an obligation at the stage of the filing of a criminal complaint and of preliminary police investigations. Indeed, the national system of relationships between civil and criminal proceedings is based on Articles 75 and 651 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the \u201cCCP\u201d), stating the principle of autonomy and separation; a civil action for damages is always possible and the civil judge has all necessary powers also to assess elements of tort that would constitute a criminal offence, with the only exception \u2013 pursuant to Article 75 \u2013 being where the civil action is proposed after a civil-party claim has already been made in the criminal proceedings or a first instance criminal sentence has been rendered; in such cases, a stay of the civil action is imposed until the forthcoming res judicata. Criminal courts are never obliged to finally determine civil-party claims and can always refer them to civil courts, even if liability is found (Article 539 CCP); in the event of discontinuance, liability for the purpose of the determination of a civil action is ascertained only if the proceedings are not at first instance, and again referral to civil courts is possible for a final determination of the claim (Articles 539 and 578 CCP). Because of the above, whether \u2013 as I prefer \u2013 the majority had endorsed the Matos e Silva approach, or rather the Anagnostopoulos approach (if left open by T\u0103nase), they should have considered that no possible breach of the right of access to a court could be found.<\/p>\n 110. As a further step, in applying the T\u0103nase criteria, given the available evidence and the domestic statute of limitations, the majority should have considered that it was not arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable for the national authorities to decide to discontinue the criminal proceedings.<\/p>\n 111. For the reasons I have tried to explain in part III of this opinion, the majority should then have come to the application of the traditional ex ante \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test, as restated by T\u0103nase(\u00a7 199). In my view, they should have considered that the test would produce a totally negative outcome, since the ex ante point in time to be referred to in order to assess whether there was a second avenue that was effective and available is the \u201cthe time when the applicant joined the criminal proceedings as a civil party\u201d. There was no civil party claim in the present case.<\/p>\n 112. Even conceding that the Arnoldi principle could be applied (on which, as I said, I am unable to agree), it is undisputed that at the time when the applicant filed his criminal complaint, he could have brought a civil action, which would not have been stayed under the applicable domestic law. Borrowing language from Association of the Victims, as validated by T\u0103nase, the Court should have considered that the applicant chose of his own free will to file a criminal complaint, an avenue which was probably simpler and less expensive, but incurring the risk that the authorities seised would not be able to examine his civil action. Therefore, the ex ante \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test would have led at any rate to the rejection of the complaint; something that the majority \u2013 incorrectly in my view, with all due respect \u2013 explicitly denied in paragraph 52 of the judgment, using an ex post criterion of defective behaviour by the authorities which, as I have tried to show, does not belong (or no longer belongs) to the Court\u2019s case-law.<\/p>\n 113. I have clarified that a supplementary step of the test is supposed to be applied if the ex ante approach reveals that no alternative civil avenue existed at the starting point of the civil-party claim. This was not the case in the present circumstances.<\/p>\n 114. I would nonetheless refer to this supplementary ex post test, which requires the Court \u2013 under T\u0103nase (\u00a7 200) \u2013 to verify whether bringing a civil action after the stay imposed by the pending criminal proceedings would \u201cnecessarily\u201d have been destined to fail. This step is very relevant in the majority\u2019s perspective, since they considered \u2013 as I have criticised at some length \u2013 that the traditional \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test was not applicable and that the duration of the criminal investigations jeopardised the civil claim expectations of the applicant, thus equating such duration with a substantive stay which \u2013 as I said \u2013 is not in reality imposed under domestic law (on this, see also the interesting considerations by Judge Wojtyczek in his separate opinion in the present case, which I share).<\/p>\n 115. The majority, although not recognising T\u0103nase (\u00a7 200) as authoritative and citing rather Anagnostopoulos, mutatis mutandis, in paragraph 53 of the judgment, did look in substance at whether there would be a prospect for the applicant to bring a civil action after the discontinuance of criminal charges. This is the passage of the majority\u2019s reasoning on which I am obliged to voice my strongest dissent. They ununderstandably introduce considerations as to the difficulties in collecting evidence, which would be the applicant\u2019s responsibility in a civil trial and with the passage of time that evidence might become dispersed. In doing so, they cite \u2013 once more \u2013 Atanasova, concerning personal injuries derived from a road accident (see paragraph 51 of this opinion). However, in Petrella, we have an alleged defamation case, by way of the publication of an article in a newspaper: a copy of the newspaper has even been produced before this Court (see paragraph 5 of the judgment); data on the circulation of newspapers are officially accessible; the different, limited evidential needs in defamation cases with respect to Atanasova are well emphasised by Judge Wojtyczek in his separate opinion in the present case (\u00a7 3), with which I agree.<\/p>\n 116. I would just additionally remark that the majority have also regrettably applied an ordinary standard of evidence to assess the alleged difficulties in starting a civil action after discontinuance. The correct standard would have implied for the majority a need to verify whether bringing a civil action after the end of the criminal investigations would have \u201cnecessarily\u201d been destined to fail (T\u0103nase, \u00a7 200). No such evidence has been provided.<\/p>\n 117. The failure to examine the applicant\u2019s civil action in the context of his criminal complaint did not, in my view, affect the very substance of his right of access to a court. It follows that the relevant complaint should have been considered by the Court manifestly ill-founded and rejected.<\/p>\n V. THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC CASE-LAW CONCERNING THE POSITION OF VICTIMS FILING COMPLAINTS WITH PROSECUTORS\/POLICE AS TO THE RIGHT TO A REASONABLE LENGTH OF PROCEEDINGS BECOMES MORE PROBLEMATIC IF EXTENDED TO ACCESS TO A COURT<\/p>\n 118. I voted with the majority, albeit with some hesitations, in finding a violation of the right to a reasonable length of proceedings. My hesitations were linked to the fact that precedents concerning the respondent State, being rather country-specific, equate the filing of a complaint with prosecutors (or the police) with a civil-party claim (see Arnoldi, \u00a7\u00a7 36-41, and the further authorities cited therein). I felt bound to adhere to these precedents, although I am aware that they do not sit well with case-law concerning other countries with similar features (see, for example, Association of the Victims, \u00a7 64, where the Court understandably considered that a prosecutor could not determine a civil claim).<\/p>\n 119. The problems posed by the above country-specific case-law now risk acquiring a greater magnitude \u2013 should the Petrella judgment become final \u2013 owing to the fact that the majority, for the first time, have extended the application of the Arnoldi \u201cflexible\u201d standard also to the area of access to a court, an aspect on which \u2013 as I have already mentioned \u2013 I dissent.<\/p>\n 120. In the present instance there is no real civil claim (see paragraph 107 of this opinion), since the domestic system only allows the bringing of such a claim at a stage that was not reached in the present case because of the discontinuance of proceedings. Can the same country-specific approach that has recognised some space for the applicability of Article 6 \u00a7 1 as to the right to a reasonable length of proceedings be ipso facto extended to the right of access to a court, even if there is no genuine civil claim? There may be serious objections to such an extension. Firstly, the right of access to a court relates only to civil rights, which cannot reasonably be understood as having been asserted before the prosecutor and\/or the police, to whom a criminal complaint is submitted (although some intention to bring a civil action might be manifested \u2013 see paragraph 23 of the judgment). Secondly, and more importantly, since the Convention does not confer any right, as such, to have third parties prosecuted or sentenced for a criminal offence (see Mustafa Tun\u00e7 and FecireTun\u00e7 v. Turkey [GC], \u00a7 218, 14 April 2015), and although the question of the applicability of Article 6 \u00a7 1 cannot depend on the recognition of the formal status of a \u201cparty\u201d in domestic law, I consider that \u2013 having regard to the right of access to a court \u2013 such a right must be indissociable from the victim\u2019s exercise of a right to bring civil proceedings in domestic law (see paragraph 10 of this opinion). Therefore, I believe that the majority have gone too far in equating the report of an alleged crime to the police or prosecutors \u2013 i.e., the authorities with whom criminal complaints are filed \u2013 with an attempt to bring civil proceedings, with the result that discontinuance would imply a denial of the right of access to a (civil) court. Thirdly, the \u201ctwo-avenue\u201d test precludes the possibility that, by this means, reporting a crime may ever become equivalent to bringing a lawsuit before a civil court, since the operation of a parallel civil avenue will always prevent a finding of a violation of the right of access.<\/p>\n 121. Affirming that filing a report of an alleged crime with the police or prosecutors is equivalent to bringing a civil lawsuit for the purposes of the right of access to a court under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention would have especially paradoxical consequences for those countries in which domestic law leaves the bringing of charges to the discretion of the prosecutor and no court \u2013 not even potentially \u2013 is involved in such assessment.<\/p>\n 122. Should the present judgment not become final, as it is hoped, this aspect, too, could be reconsidered.<\/p>\n 123. I may add that, again feeling bound by the Arnoldi case-law, I also voted with the majority in finding a violation of Article 13. I wish to clarify that such a finding on my part is of course limited to the fact that the domestic system does not open the national compensatory scheme for an excessive length of proceedings to civil party-like situations under Arnoldi. In no way am I able to agree that a domestic remedy is necessary to complain about an alleged breach of the right of access to a court which, in my view, is non-existent in the present case.<\/p>\n VI. THE DANGERS THAT THE MAJORITY\u2019S APPROACH ENTAILS FOR THE FUTURE AND THE NEED FOR RECONSIDERATION<\/p>\n 124. The confusion that the majority\u2019s judgment creates, with due respect, between access to remedies for civil claims and problems related to the duration of proceedings (both civil and criminal) is not without consequences for future applicants and Contracting States. As I have mentioned, the right to an effective remedy is also involved.<\/p>\n 125. Concerning the problems related to an excessive length of proceedings, the Court, both through its case-law and the voice of its Presidents, in a genuine vision of subsidiarity, constantly encourages Contracting States to the Convention to establish effective domestic remedies to deal with the length of proceedings. For example, in Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) (no. 36813\/97, [GC] \u00a7 183, 29 March 2006) the Court held:<\/p>\n \u201cThe best solution in absolute terms is indisputably, as in many spheres, prevention. The Court … has stated on many occasions that Article 6 paragraph 1 imposes on the Contracting States the duty to organise their judicial systems in such a way that their courts can meet … the obligation to hear cases within a reasonable time. Where the judicial system is deficient in this respect, a remedy designed to expedite the proceedings in order to prevent them from becoming excessively lengthy is the most effective solution. Such a remedy offers an undeniable advantage over a remedy affording only compensation since it also prevents a finding of successive violations in respect of the same set of proceedings and does not merely repair the breach a posteriori, as does a compensatory remedy …\u201d<\/p>\n 126. Although an expeditory approach is to be preferred, the Court has accepted that States can also choose to introduce only a compensatory remedy, without that remedy being generally regarded as ineffective.<\/p>\n 127. The member States of the Council of Europe have themselves adopted an extensive toolkit \u201cin order to promote and assist fulfilment of their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights\u201d, emphasising that the implementation of domestic remedies \u201cshould permit a reduction in the Court\u2019s workload as a result, on the one hand, of a decrease in the number of cases reaching it and, on the other, of the fact that the detailed treatment of cases at national level would facilitate their later examination by the Court\u201d[9]. The Committee of Ministers has, in particular, dealt with the topic of remedies in the area of duration of proceedings in Recommendation CM\/Rec(2010)3 \u201con effective remedies for excessive length of proceedings\u201d, which was accompanied by a guide to good practice[10].<\/p>\n 128. Remedies for an excessive length of proceedings, of both an expeditory and a compensatory nature, have become widespread in several European systems. The Court has consequently had to examine, in its case-law, several aspects of these systems.<\/p>\n 129. What is the relationship between such domestic remedies, designed to enforce subsidiarity in the area of length of trials, and possible breaches of the right of access to a court? The answer can be found in Arnoldi v. Italy, \u00a7 54, where the Court has already<\/p>\n \u201cnote[d] that [a domestic compensatory remedy] constitutes an effective remedy for complaining about the length of the procedure and not, from the point of view of Article 6, of the lack of access to a court nor … of the consequences arising from such a lack of access.\u201d<\/p>\n 130. As a consequence, in the same judgment (\u00a7 55; see also \u00a7\u00a7 12-14), the Court stated that the six-month period laid down by Article 35 \u00a7 1 started running from the discontinuance of the criminal proceedings for the purposes of a complaint regarding a possible denial of access to a court; whereas \u2013 since the compensatory remedy was in principle effective with respect to a complaint concerning the length of the proceedings \u2013 in so far as that different complaint was concerned, it started when the domestic decision dismissing the compensation claim became final.<\/p>\n 131. Thus, it is evident that \u2013 until the majority in Petrella decided to rediscover Atanasova \u2013 applicants could choose to follow different lines of action: lodging a compensatory remedy domestically and then, in case of dismissal, applying to the Court, in order to complain about the length of proceedings; or applying directly to Strasbourg for a lack of access to a court, given that in principle there were no domestic remedies effective for that purpose; or also applying to the Court in order to bring both complaints, whether or not the applicant previously acted domestically, with some risk of inadmissibility of at least one complaint in such a case. Be that as it may, before Petrella applicants could rely on some certainties: they could expect that in some most serious cases the Court would follow Anagnostopoulos (today, within the limits set by T\u0103nase) and find a violation of the right of access to a court and, in that event, no separate issue arose under the viewpoint of duration; otherwise, in most cases they could decide to bring the case successfully \u2013 under the traditional Matos e Silva approach \u2013 only with respect to the length of proceedings, after exhausting domestic compensatory remedies if available.<\/p>\n 132. The risk for the future, if the majority\u2019s view in Petrella becomes the final word in this case, is linked to the unfortunate choice by the majority in holding that the right of access to a court and the right to a reasonable length of proceedings can be violated at the same time and on account of the same negligence\/omissions. This will entail the paradoxical outcome that applicants will have to apply to the Court, in principle, twice: once in six (in the near future, four) months from the discontinuance of criminal proceedings, in respect of the right of access to a court; and again in six (four) months from the final decision on the domestic compensatory remedy, as regards the length of the proceedings.<\/p>\n 133. One could then kiss goodbye, in this area, to the need to promote a detailed handling of cases at national level, with regard for subsidiarity, and to prevent an excessive workload for the Court. Governments would run the risk of double (national and international) redress, based on the same facts.<\/p>\n 134. But those that I have just described are not the only dangers which I anticipate, should the majority\u2019s approach become final. The further confusion deriving from the refusal by the majority to be faithful to a more traditional approach to the \u201ctwo-avenue test\u201d, as stated by the Grand Chamber in T\u0103nase, and from the consequent exhumation of Atanasova also in this respect, will oblige applicants to assess, before applying to the Court, whether the discontinuance of the proceedings was consequent to some \u201cresponsibility\u201d of the authorities (and in that case they would not be obliged to initiate a separate civil claim) or it was not (or the responsibility was not so serious \u2013 and in that case they would be obliged to start the different civil avenue). Would this be in the interest of protecting human rights? Would the Contracting States be facilitated in their task of ensuring domestic protection of those rights?<\/p>\n 135. I do not believe that the majority\u2019s approach serves the purpose of interpreting and applying the Convention in a simple, clear and foreseeable way; it rather creates problems for the applicants and Governments that may even become insurmountable.<\/p>\n VII. CONCLUSION<\/p>\n 136. I was unable to share the majority\u2019s consideration of this case concerning their understanding of the content and the protection of the right of access to a court.<\/p>\n 137. Supposedly, the majority\u2019s approach, whereby they recognise, at the same time and in respect of the same facts, both a violation of the right of access to a court and of the right to a reasonable duration of proceedings under Article 6 of the Convention, affords a wider protection of human rights. In reality, in my view, it brings confusion and creates complications, obliging applicants and Governments to make complex assessments before lodging an application or mounting their defences, and also diminishes the overall efficiency of domestic compensatory schemes for an excessive duration of proceedings.<\/p>\n 138. In writing this opinion, I have tried to highlight the serious questions concerning the application of the Convention that the majority\u2019s approach raises. What is the relationship between the protection of the right of access to a court and the protection of procedural rights, in particular the right to a reasonable duration of proceedings? What is the relevance of parallel avenues to guarantee access to a court in order to determine a civil claim? What are the precise steps of a possible test in this area? Are negligence\/omissions by the authorities relevant? Can the position of a victim complaining to the prosecutor and\/or police be deemed equivalent to that of a civil-party claimant?<\/p>\n 139. In asking these questions, the reader of the Petrella judgment will perhaps also wonder about the Court\u2019s fidelity to its case-law. For these reasons, it is to be hoped that the majority\u2019s view is not the final word in this case. After the Golder legacy, the Matos e Silva confrontation between the Commission and the Court, and the T\u0103nase restatement of case-law, the need is felt for a further clarification of the content and protection of the right of access to a court.<\/p>\n ___________<\/p>\n [1] Dans le corps de l\u2019article, il est pr\u00e9cis\u00e9 qu\u2019il s\u2019agit d\u2019un ancien juge non professionnel (\u00ab ex vicepretoreonorario \u00bb). https:\/\/fra.europa.eu\/en\/publication\/2016\/handbook-european-law-relating-access-justice and https:\/\/www.echr.coe.int\/documents\/handbook_access_justice_eng.pdf .
\nAFFAIRE PETRELLA c. ITALIE<\/strong>
\n(Requ\u00eate no 24340\/07)<\/em>
\nARR\u00caT<\/p>\n
\nArt 6 \u00a7 1 (civil) \u2022 D\u00e9lai raisonnable \u2022 Dur\u00e9e excessivede la proc\u00e9dure civile
\nArt 13 (+ Art 6) \u2022 Absence de recours interne effectif quant \u00e0 la dur\u00e9e de la proc\u00e9dure<\/p>\n
\n18 mars 2021<\/p>\n
\nKsenija Turkovi\u0107, pr\u00e9sidente,
\nKrzysztof Wojtyczek,
\nLinos-Alexandre Sicilianos,
\nPere Pastor Vilanova,
\nP\u00e9ter Paczolay,
\nGilberto Felici,<\/p>\n
\nGreffi\u00e8re\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Pr\u00e9sidente<\/p>\n
\nR.D.<\/p>\n
\n[2] For reasons of readability, I will refer to cases, after the first citation, with the first words of their title only, omitting expressions like \u201ccited above\u201d.
\n[3] Throughout this opinion, any emphasis \u2013 when used \u2013 is my own.
\n[4] The handbook is downloadable at<\/p>\n
\n[5] See https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/help\/about-help.
\n[6] Thus \u201cyou can\u2019t have your cake and eat it\u201d, in English and several other languages, whereas French refers to getting money from selling butter, and keeping the butter; not to mention the Italian with its reference to the wine barrel … Global popular wisdom expresses truths based on common sense.
\n[7] Again for the sake of readability, starting from this point in the text and throughout this opinion, quotes of passages originally only in French are translated. The translations are my own.
\n[8] The relevance of the citations following the a contrario indication in this passage will be commented upon in paragraphs 56-65 of this opinion.
\n[9] Council of Europe, Guide to good practice in respect of domestic remedies (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 18 September 2013), p. 5.
\n[10] See, for references, ibid., pp. 9, 15, and 39.<\/p>\n